> It's just a demo instance, but, these front ends are barely revealed to the public
This genuinely doesn't look any different from the control panels of commercial infostealers and RATs sold on Russian hacking forums. Those usually sell for between $200 and $20,000 depending on features and pricing model (one-time vs. ongoing subscription).
These spyware companies hype themselves up, but they're really not any different from Ivan's RAT-as-a-Service, besides having extra exploits to burn and wealthier customers.
It's too bad that "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized" has become "we can download a full copy of all of your files at any time, or continually, if we feel like it, even if we don't suspect you of a crime".
Can somebody please explain to an idiot (me) how is this possible for this to keep going? I thought that the world has decided that spyware is illegal and can't be produced. Is this company related to israeli government? If not, why is it allowed to function?
What is allowed to companies is not allowed to private citizens. If you want to systematically break copyright laws or steal data from people, do it as Joe's LLC. Joe would go to prison for copyright infringement or hacking other people, Joe's LLC can do as it please.
The message can't be intercepted in transit, since we are talking about spyware, I assume they get it from the device, hard to defend against that if they have access to your process' memory space.
Even if you had to input your private key every time you wanted to read or send a message, having malware in your phone voids practically any form of encryption, because it has to be decrypted eventually to be used.
not at all. there is no encryption that can save you when one of the legitimate participants is somehow compromised. doesn't even need to be a sophisticated device compromise, literal shoulder surfing does that too.
You're correct in the literal sense that they did say those words, but the entire comment clearly demonstrated a lack of surprise that reveals the opening words to be intended ironically.
This entire thread should be annihilated, but since you mentioned being pedantic...
You're correct that a pure encryption algorithm doesn't use hashing. But real-world encryption systems will include an HMAC to detect whether messages were altered in transit. HMACs do use hash functions.
Thank you for that link. Your original comment implied that Signal's threat model should have included an attacker-controlled end. The only way to do that is to make decryption impossible by anyone, including the intended recipient. A labyrinthine way to do that would be to substitute the symmetric-encryption algorithm with a hash algorithm, which of course destroys the plaintext, but does accomplish the goal of obfuscating it in transit, at rest, and forever.
I guess they've seen a Signal icon in the photo. Of course the interception is done locally on the phone (so it's basically "man-in-the-client" rather than a "man-in-the-middle"), therefore the Signal protocol is not really worth being mentioned as it has nothing to do with local interception.
> It's just a demo instance, but, these front ends are barely revealed to the public
This genuinely doesn't look any different from the control panels of commercial infostealers and RATs sold on Russian hacking forums. Those usually sell for between $200 and $20,000 depending on features and pricing model (one-time vs. ongoing subscription).
These spyware companies hype themselves up, but they're really not any different from Ivan's RAT-as-a-Service, besides having extra exploits to burn and wealthier customers.
That is, companies can make and sell it as long as they only sell it to governments and only the ones that we like.
Moxie's "unbreakable" end-to-end communication protocol.
Lol, so like ... all encryption schemes since the 70s?
Hashing is not encrypting.
You can learn more about the topic here, https://www.okta.com/identity-101/hashing-vs-encryption/
Load this page, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Advanced_Encryption_Standard
Ctrl-F "hash". No mention of it.
Before being pedantic at least check out the url in that comment to get the basics going.
You're correct that a pure encryption algorithm doesn't use hashing. But real-world encryption systems will include an HMAC to detect whether messages were altered in transit. HMACs do use hash functions.
> Hashing is not encrypting.
> You can learn more about the topic here, https://www.okta.com/identity-101/hashing-vs-encryption/
Thank you for that link. Your original comment implied that Signal's threat model should have included an attacker-controlled end. The only way to do that is to make decryption impossible by anyone, including the intended recipient. A labyrinthine way to do that would be to substitute the symmetric-encryption algorithm with a hash algorithm, which of course destroys the plaintext, but does accomplish the goal of obfuscating it in transit, at rest, and forever.
See, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moxie_Marlinspike