The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment. But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth. Why should a researcher be effectively penalized for responsibly telling a vendor instead of selling the bug to a "research firm" or three-letter agency?
It's one thing if you're an open source project maintainer just trying to put something out to the community. The math is a lot different if you're Google.
If the vulnerability is already being exploited in the wild --- as in, it's a vector people already know about and are tracking --- it's possibly not worth much at all. Vulnerability valuations depend heavily on the lifespan of the vulnerability; payments on black market are tranched (explicitly or less explicitly, as with "maintenance payments") based on whether they're patched.
Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.
Isn’t the implication that the vulnerability had already been found and exploited instead of reported to Google, because its value to Google was so low? Whoever found it originally had more incentive to sell it on the grey/black market. Or is the incentive structure truly different for vulnerabilities discovered to be already in the wild?
Some exploit hunters sell strictly to the grey/black market to avoid opsec issues. If you're selling on both, you're more likely to be identified by both.
Sometimes, yes. But usually, as a security researcher, you usually sold to brokers. The brokers made the vulnerability into a reliable exploit. That is whst they then sold to agencies. For a markup of course. The industry was in a tough spot already the past years. Now AI is shaking it up even more.
This "only" escapes the JavaScript sandbox. You still need to chain it with an escape for the process sandbox. So it's not just the boring stuff of turning a predictable crash into arbitrary execution, but also finding a second RCE vulnerability to chain this with
there are many vulns that are sitting idle waiting to be chained like this. plus in some cases adjacent bugs can be found once you find a bug like this.
> Spacing around an em dash varies. Most newspapers insert a space before and after the dash, and many popular magazines do the same, but most books and journals omit spacing, closing whatever comes before and after the em dash right up next to it.
Before the LLMs made the emdash the tool of the electronic oppressor I used it often enough and other people did too.
I hate that it's basically become the little hitler moustache of punctuation. There was at least one guy who was really enjoying his tiny little moustache until he couldn't anymore. That is the emdash for me.
In the spirit of good pedantic fun, I'll point out that en dashes are no less inconvenient than em dashes for the average Windows user to insert. The hyphen-minus immediately accessible on the keyboard was (and is) used for the common typewriting kludge attested in Garner's[1] as well as the LaTeX-syntax triple-hyphen em dash (which, might I add, for lack of a better place to do so, isn't one of the ways I've seen dashes used by LLMs or disguised by their operators).
The value of future reports should also be a component though. By paying a low amount you discourage ethical bug bounty hackers from bothering to look for more exploits. If I think I'm only getting $1000 for a Chrome issue versus $100,000 for an Acme Co issue, I'll be spending my time looking for Acme Co issues.
Bug bounties are as much a way of attracting talent to even try to exploit your system as they are about the exploits themselves. If you lowball the bounties the talent goes elsewhere.
How do you figure? The value of the report is, ethics aside, the same as the value of exploiting it. Doesn’t matter if I can conceive of it, it matters if I can exploit it.
Supply and demand has to be considered. The more parties aware of the vulnerability, the more attractive sellers (reporters) have to make their ask to the buyer (defender).
Not following that. The report is the upstream resource the exploit needs. The value of iron ore is definitely not the value of the steel made with it. Or maybe I misunderstood your view?
That's really informative but maybe a little overly capitalist-brained.
We shouldn't look to the black market as cost discovery for these vulnerabilities, most non-criminal researchers are not putting up an ask order and letting the black market compete with Google.
There's plenty of legal gray-hat companies that will buy a bug. Zerodium is a good example though it no longer exists. These companies in turn sell to NSA, etc. maybe even foreign governments for all I know. There's very little regulation of the space iirc.
I had a friend that worked in the space. He lived an exciting life; I hope he's still alive..
Ah the classic programmer mistake when encountering the legal system of thinking ‘but surely this act, in and of itself, could not be considered illegal?’ When what the law criminalizes are not mere acts but actions carried out with intent and knowledge in a context.
‘Officer, you can’t arrest me for carrying a gold bar!’
‘I can if you are carrying it out of the Federal Reserve vault without permission’
Similarly:
‘Surely selling someone the knowledge that a piece of software can be hacked isn’t illegal?’
‘It is if you know or suspect that that person’s intention is to use that knowledge to commit crimes’
This would make you a ‘coconspirator’ or possibly an ‘accessory before the fact’ in any crimes they committed.
That's one of the points, yes, but the black market doesn't dictate the value of the exploit to Google.
A hardline bargaining position with Google would be more like "pay me what I want, or else I'll give it to all takers on the black market for maximum damage". That would be unethical and probably illegal to boot but it's a better definition of value than "1$ greater than max bid".
The value to Google - sure. But the market value of the exploit itself - the black market I think is a factor in that regardless of what Google offers.
The value of something is dictated by what _the market_ offers, and just because Google throws a lowball price because _they_ don't value it doesn't necessarily mean that the value of the exploit itself is as low as they dictate.
There will always be someone who would screw Google just for the love of the game, and if they got a better price from elsewhere, I don't see why _morality_ would really play that big of a role. It all comes down to incentives, and if Google doesn't incentivize doing the good thing enough, then someone _will_ incentivize them to do the bad thing just a bit more.
Markets are fundamental things and exist regardless of any kind of moral "should". Otherwise we wouldn't have people buying hard drugs or trafficing women.
Well, the implication (and I'm not saying this is right) is that to Google it's only worth $1k to have this brought to their attention by a white hat, versus finding out by exploitation.
Which means that they have zero concern from this incident about reputational damage to themselves or their browser. That's pretty good circumstantial evidence of a monopolistic practice, when you can safely assume that there's effectively no difference to your bottom line if your software is hacked.
But google is also a monopsony. There isn't anyone else the researcher can ethically sell it to. They just have to take whatever bounty google decides to pay.
Google should have been split up into shreds like 2 decades ago. Search wants to have income from ads? Good sell it to anybody who pays the most, just like every single newspaper does. Gmail wants to sell our data, or ad space? Good sell them, and not just reuse them internally. Chrome wants to monetize every single request you do? Go, sell them on the open market. And not this fake, "we're separate companies, but only on paper" way.
This should have been done a long time ago.
Firefox, and the browser market would be much more healthy. Btw, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, now even Twitter/SpaceX and all of these should have been forced the same way. And of course not just in this field, but all of them, like oil companies. They can pivot, of course, with some grace period, but that would mean giving up something at the end.
And if we are there, we can abolish most of trade secrecy too, which exists only to keep up the status quo while hindering progress.
Google is the answer to an Internet that largely blocks ads and uses backdoors to circumvent pay walls. A single massive pillar with enough surface area to carry all the dead weight.
If people want a better internet, they can start fostering one, rather than endlessly complain that someone else should be fostering it for them.
There will probably be upwards of 1000 people who read this comment that have used Google services for 15+ years, never loaded a single ad, and complain about Google ruining the internet. Please, pick-up a mirror. Nobody wants to build a competitor to serve your cheap ass
Google is routinely buying and destroying competitors.
They lower prices to kill competition en-masse. They promote their own products in search and elsewhere over paid ads.
Search Engine have chicken and egg problem, you can only have a good search if enough people use it to tune the ranking and see enough search spam cases.
“Just compete with a monopoly on their own field with one hand tied behind”
That’s exactly right, and applies to more than Google. I can’t think of a single browser vendor that would think a single vulnerability materially causes reputational damage.
No company will ever value your privacy or security more than or equal to how much you value them. This is why you gotta keep an unencrypted bitcoin private key in your password manager. I'll know pretty quickly (within ~ 10 minutes or less) that someone has access to all of my passwords.
While I agree 1000 is hilariously low for this, worth is hard to quantify. Do you pay what it could theoretically cost your company? the amount the top bidding bad actor would be willing to pay?
The discount Google is getting on bounties versus internal spend is easy to estimate:
# assumed to be $0.5mil USD or greater
A := What quantity of salaries-and-benefits and AI-dollars does Google spend on zero-day research?
# assumed to be greater than zero
B := How many full sandbox RCEs are they *hoping* to discover per year with that budget?
# $/RCE budgeted spend
C := A ÷ B
# $/bounty
D := $1000 USD
# % discount per bounty relative to in-house spend
E := (C - D) / C
While we lack the data to be sure, it is reasonable to estimate that they're getting a discount of 90% or better versus internal spend on this bounty payment, if one assumes that they do not have many sandbox RCEs left undiscovered. It's unclear whether that assumption holds, but with only a single researcher at an assumed $0.5mil/year (all-inclusive after pay, stock, and benefits) is enough to support the plausibility of that 90% figure, before accounting at market rates for their internal use of the house AIs.
So, the most likely case is that they're greedy and miserly, and hope we don't do the math. However I recognize that there are judgment calls to be made here. Either their internal spending finds hundreds of RCEs per year, or they're significantly discounting bounty payments versus their actual worth, or they're negligent in budgeting for RCE discovery at all, or they assign zero value to the security of the Chromium platform underpinning Edge, Electron, et al. All of these are bad in different ways; one hopes a competent tech reporter actually pursues this line of questioning with them!
> or they're negligent in budgeting for RCE discovery at all, or they assign zero value to the security of the Chromium platform underpinning Edge, Electron, et al
I generally agree, but a 3rd explanation is they figure that too generous a bounty will flood them with reports of minor issues making major ones harder to see (and costing time and money to verify that could be spent looking for security issues).
Having previously worked near a bounty program, I can confirm that they are regardless flooded with people fishing for bounties, even before AI, no matter how cheap the bounty may be — people will grift anything with the most pathetic skript kiddie attempts possible to try and pad their resume with a hit, and bounties that pay $0 are more valuable than pull requests that pay $0.
we really do not want to engineer a system in which using bugs to make money is considered economically legitimate activity. It is still crime. The main reason to report bugs and get the bounties for doing so is still because it makes the world safer and healthier. The money is there to make is to incentivize the work of finding and reporting them -- not to outbid the bad actors.
I would say that maintaining legacy systems as a software engineer is effectively "using bugs to make money" and very much an "economically legitimate activity".
If old systems had no bugs/issues, companies could do without the maintenance burden altogether (which includes even systems not being evolved/extended).
Companies sometimes reward their employees with important bug fixes. When I worked on a big dev team, we'd even decide what were the most important fixes and give people a special 5k bonus or something.
But they weren't security issues necessarily. I never thought about it, fixing a huge performance issue is big. A security fix that gets caught early makes no noise so you just don't know how important it would have been. We also once had a really terrible bug that lead to lots of customers getting effectively attacked.
"Crime" is very flexible term. One country's criminal is another country hero. Maybe the author would sell the vulnerability to an organization making exploits for government use.
"Safety" is also a relative thing, when the world is safer for one party, it is usually worse for another.
As our surroundings grow more secure, the justice system variant of swatting becomes a greater portion of the threats to worry about. There will be abuseable bugs and situations in our non static world, there is no way we'll ever have perfect security of anything. So a motivated actor with a grudge should be able to plant something a place you provably beyond reasonable doubt have sole control of, given enough time. How do you propose then that we secure deniability once the justice system is wielded as a weapon against the innocent, when everyone feels that there is no reasonable way defects exist and could have been used? Just look at the British post office scandal, real world justice systems have already operated under the assumption that software doesn't have bugs for decades, which speaks volumes on their inclination to believe that they both exist and are used by a unknown third party with ill intent. Thus the widespread trust in that things are secure is a threat in itself. And unlike airports we don't need the users to have an artificial sense of security for computers, networks, software, and digital services to be viable markets.
Brain dead moral relativism argument. The question is whether eg. a group trying to scam elders out of insurance money or a Columbian cartel to hack local politicians to do blackmail, or South Sudan to hack Darfur or whatever, should be allowed to compete with the companies making products for their own exploits.
99.999% of people will agree that reducing software vulnerabilities is desirable if they're able to understand the question, including the bad actors themselves a lot of the times.
The situations like bad state actors are already not bound by laws, and things like keeping activism legal are better fought for through other ways
It's one thing to hold something for ransom ("give me $5M or I release the 0day"). It's another to sell a valuable piece of information ("give me $5M if you want the 0day"). As long as you're only offering the bug to the company who would be impacted by its release, there's nothing unethical about asking for payment.
Maybe you think that, ethically, all bugs should be reported, regardless of payment, because it prevents harm. Well a lot of things prevent harm that we don't all take it upon ourselves to do voluntarily. Should everyone do all safety-related work for free? If we don't want to do it for free, should we not do safety work at all?
If the company really wanted it safe, and they can't make it safe themselves, they can pay someone else to make it safe. If they aren't willing to do that, then nobody is obligated to do free work for them, because we don't require anyone else to do safety-critical work for free. Let's not forget, this isn't a scrappy startup struggling for a seed round, this is one of the world's largest corporations with billions of dollars in cash. If they want your labor, make them pay for it.
Well, someone did decide to tell google about this in exchange for a thousand dollars (albeit unclear how much the money was the motivator). Doesn't that mean the market did decide in google's favour?
Someone decided to tell Google about this in exchange for an unknown amount of money, chosen unilaterally by Google at a later date, at which point the market value of the vulnerability is $0.
courts are very good at reasoning about things like this and figuring out its bullshit. Zerodium is probably the closest you could get to some reasonable denial about this. Selling an exploit on crime.com for "research puposes only" will get you laughed at on the way to the cell.
Has anyone actually been convicted of abetting a crime by selling a vulnerability, by itself, not conspiring with the buyer to commit a crime using said vulnerability? Not as far as I can see. It would be absurd to jail someone for accurately describing a bug.
It would be absurd to jail someone for accurately describing a bug on their blog or whatever.
Not so much for taking money from someone who the buyer should know has no reason to be interested in buying the information. And either you know who your counterparty is, in which case you know that they are using it nefariously, or you don't know who your counterparty is, in which case you know that they are using it nefariously. Any court and any jury should see straight through this.
Similarly if you figure out how to get the ATM down the street to give you free money, and you "accurately describe the bug" to people who pay you, and they use it to steal money from the ATM, expect to be charged for participating in, and in fact being an instrumental enabler of their crime. Because it is beyond all reasonable doubt that you could've believed they could have been interested enough to pay you for any other reason.
Has anyone actually been charged and convicted for disclosing knowledge of a vulnerability in exchange for money with no further collusion to commit a crime?
Jeremy Jethro seems to be an example. His lawyer claimed he had no knowledge of what the exploit would be used for, and that it didn't even work, but he ultimately pled guilty to criminal conspiracy.
Hmm. Are you aware of any publicly identifiable security researchers that openly talk about selling their exploits on the black market?
Since it's all so legal and risk-free, you'd think selling an exploit for a million bucks would be quite the feather in their cap!
It may also be helpful to visualize being interviewed by the FBI and being asked "Did you sell this exploit? To whom? How much did you receive? For what purpose did you think it would be used?". And to remember they already know the answers to these questions, and lying to the FBI is also a crime.
In the past I would have thought this would incentivize finding bugs that might never be found. However it is now clear that all bugs that can be found will be found. So this makes a ton of sense.
Maybe needs a Good-Guy-Buy-It-Now w/instant delivery at a fair price. (OK that’s kind of a threat—you’re running an auction and you have the price the corp has to pay to avoid the auction ending.)
$1k is so dumb and the fact we’re discussing auctions is proof (hello, Sundar, what you doing over there?).
Guess this will change after the next e.g. nationwide hospital ransomware by a hacker who publicly laments bounty rates, if the news cycle accommodates the story long enough.
> Guess this will change after the next e.g. nationwide hospital ransomware by a hacker who publicly laments bounty rates, if the news cycle accommodates the story long enough.
Negotiating with terrorists or black mailers is a bad idea.
Maybe some code is so important and heavily trafficked it becomes a public works project, and various legs can bid for pieces of the project, line how all infrastructure works.
you're taking someone's word it's being exploited. It says right at the top of the report
> allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*
A bug in V8 leads to code execution in Chrome's web page process. It does not lead to execution in general. For that you need other exploits that escape the web page process. Those are not detailed here. This CVE is not a big deal. You're responding the poster's title, not the actual CVE
Then what it was chained to is the real issue, not this one. The entire point of having webpages run in their own process is to prevent bugs like this one from doing worse. If you're claiming this bug is the bug that matters, you're effectively claiming they shouldn't need to run pages in their own process and just trust that there are zero bugs. No major browser does that. Not Firefox, not Safari, and not Chromium.
that's why bugs in the webpage process pay out very little. Without a worse 2nd bug, they are less serious. Bugs that let you RCE outside the webpage process pay much higher.
That sounds like a dumb strategy because if non-evil people sit on individual pieces of the puzzle waiting to solve it in full google loses most of the advantage of having a multi-layer system…
Makes you wonder how many hacks wouldn't have occurred if security researchers (and vulnerability disclosure) was actually rewarded proportional to the possible/potential damage said vulnerability may have otherwise caused.
It's insulting how poorly incentivised white hats are, just look at how much North Korea is raking in with their cyber shenanigans - current estimates put it at around $6.75 billion to date (over the past 10 years or so).
There are plenty of people out there who find vulnerabilities and sell them to the highest bidder. Anyone is welcome to do it, including the researchers and hackers reporting them responsibly. There's no need to try and make a convoluted ethical justification. "I did this bad thing because you didn't pay me enough not to" doesn't work past the 6th grade.
They're not going to stop underpaying security researchers just because security researchers decide to sell them to vuln brokers. Advocating for this is reckless.
they will if it becomes common knowledge that nobody serious is participating in their bug bounty programs. besides, they have incredibly deep pockets and they can afford to pay 6 figures for bugs like these
advocating for this is much more ethical than donating money to Google. I'd rather have that money go my family than a multi trillion dollar company.
> How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
On average, probably not that much. What's the amortized cost of all testing, static analysis, and audit / code review, per "prevented potential bug"?
The potential damage is all to users bound by terms and conditions, who are unlikely to collect damages successfully from a vendor. Structurally, vendors don’t have to care. Therefore, vulnerabilities have little direct financial value to a vendor.
It’s natural to feel cognitive dissonance because the value to the vendor is so disproportionate to the potential harm to users, but the incentive structure is what it is.
A vulnerability which lets an attacker harm the vendor has much higher direct financial value.
> But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.
I'd point out that part of the reason the grey and black market pays so well is because it is that type of market. You have to pay people extra to look past their morals and a risk premium against potential reputational and legal consequences.
Someone could sell it on the black market, sell it to Google, or just move on with their life and not sell it.
I don't know what this is worth on the black market, maybe I'd be scammed by even trying to sell it. Maybe I don't want to be a bad person. These are all things that go into the prices
Interesting question, and how much should a user pay Google to fix the vulnerability? I suppose the smallest unit of currency less than the amount of effort they'd have to put in to mitigate it. A fully market economy of bug fixing here is an interesting idea, certainly, but if I'm being honest I actually don't want to pay Google a thousand dollars to fix security issues. In the limit, what would happen is that I end up with the competitor browser Elgoog Emorhc which fixes security issues for free, and pays very little for them, which is the status quo.
In the world where security issues are paid for entirely at market rate, it would also be very important to not use browsers by poor groups because they would be unable to pay for security reports on the market and consequently the browsers would be less secure.
Interesting idea, for sure, but I don't think it lands in a place I want to go since I neither desire stochastic payments nor desire that all browsers should be from large corporations.
With such low payment, it makes one wonder how many exploits exist which were sold to 3rd parties and are currently used in the wild without Google even knowing about it.
It sounds insultingly low, yeah. I'm trying to imagine why they would pay so little. The only two reasons I can think of are either (a) they were already aware of it and fixing it, and therefore the report didn't really change much, or (b) it requires an unusual configuration or otherwise rare opportunity to that makes it impractical to exploit most users. Really curious to see what the issue was whenever it gets made public.
Imagine the consideration for the Trump admin, should we pay this guy a million bucks for this attack that gets us into the command system of Iran, or would that be unethical. Of course they don't consider that at this time.
I heard, on the podcast Darknet Diaries, that there are auctions for zero days in Argentina. This security researcher could probably have cleared a million dollars for a bug like that if they were unscrupulous. The bug bounty should absolutely be higher.
> Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.
Why not? Capitalism requires they maximize their value. These profitable companies lay bare at the altar, so they should understand the requirements of their god.
> how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
What? That's not how you calculate the value of something at all.
The value is not based on the prevention, it's the cost of the cure.
The problem is they are being flooded with both fake AND real disclosures. Imagine if they tried to pay out $250,000 or more per bug? Would the cost be worth it? Maybe, but shareholders may not be pleased... Unless they viewed it as insurance against it being more financially sound for the finder to sell the exploit on the gray or black market instead...
In fact, Google will pay you $250,000 for a full chain exploit. The CVE reported here is a renderer process vulnerability. Google used to pay more for those before the vulnpocalypse. Now, they are fixing hundreds of bugs per week that they find themselves.
They should just multiply a base rate against the severity level. Say the base rate is ranged so low-severity stuff is $500-1K base but high-severity stuff is $10K base. That would net a researcher ~$88K for this specific bug (8.8 severity).
CVEs are handed out like candy for non issues, the severity rating system isn’t a serious evaluation of the actual severity (eg a vulnerable function may not even be compiled in), the scoring is inconsistent and subjective and frequently inflated to make the severity seem worse, and with the AI flood they have a massive backlog of handing out CVEs.
Like look at CVEs curl dealt with at one point that were just completely bogus and given huge severity ratings to start with.
But honestly if you’re the one proposing a “simple solution” maybe do some research yourself.
You've been on HN for 16 years and still comment the lowest brow possible comment on security vulnerability threads that the bounty isn't big enough. How many times do we need to have a top comment crying about the same thing? If you think its too little, sell the exploits you find for more.
>Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment
Why not?
"Hey, I found a cvss 8.8 bug in chrome that allows arbitrary code execution when loading my http url. For X USD I can send a report along, and for Y USD I can send a commit with the fix."
Sounds like a basic contract to me
What I do think is ethically dubious is:
"Hey I found this bug and I will MAKE IT PUBLIC WITHIN 90 DAYS SO LOOK AT IT"
I know it's a convention from 'security researchers', but I think the first approach is more ethical than the latter.
The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
in the darkweb, due to crypto, a lot. there is where the $ is, whether it's stealing crypto directly or phishing developers.
>researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment.
Hell no, the same level bugs at Google should be enthusiastically paid way more than from an undercapitalized startup, who actually needs the help more so. Should be orders of magnitude difference in relation to scale.
>it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.
Honest fair-dealing should come into play at least but there are some players who have struck it so rich they can now take enough pride to pay an additional premium just because they can, and their good human nature almost compels them ethically to do way more than the minimum.
Just apparently not at Google.
If a company has achieved financial success to a degree that they are no longer worried about complete failure for the foreseeable future, then it's only a matter of generosity vs Scrooge-like behavior.
What's missing from their overall business acumen if they can't even afford to project an image of generosity yet?
If they're not actively making a serious effort to pay the maximum they can well afford for bugs that are truly serious, there is a technical term for that. Chickenshit.
Normalising running arbitrary code delivered over the internet (in the form of JavaScript and WASM), as a necessary condition for accessing most web pages may not have been one of the best decisions we have made.
I think the problem is that we've let JS engines become absurdly complex so there's no way to avoid them having really gross bugs.
That said, I think that the V8 team has done a fantastic job of securing their engine. Their heap sandbox feature is really inspiring! It's really wild that (as far as I can understand this issue) someone is able to bypass it.
(Posted from a memory safe browser - WebKit MiniBrowser compiled with Fil-C. Pretty sure this is safer than even V8 and the heap sandbox.)
The additional performance from the JIT is actually really small for most tasks. It should, ideally, be disabled by default. For your average JS you get <10% performance gain. Most of the cost is browser API, not JS, so the performance is underwhelming.
It’s only very heavy calculations that see a boost in performance. But, realistically, how many websites require this or currently use this today? <1%? Maybe <.1%?
This is pretty typical across JIT engines, too. PHP also sees only a slight increase in performance from the JIT. Because of the nature of PHP applications, most time is spend on the network and database. Only very CPU-heavy code sees a significant speed up.
That’s even the case for C#, which is why the dotnet runtime only conditionally JIT compiles code. Only hot path code is eligible for JIT compilation.
I’ve done that long ago. In fact on iOS it’s simpler: since Apple doesn’t allow third party browsers to use the JIT, using any browser other than Safari will disable the JIT.
I'm glad I've already done that! I haven't seen any difference in performance like others mention though. Weird. The only override I've made is for a website which needs to run some client-side cryptography code and it would take ages without the JIT.
We live in a world where my laptop is forced to waste tons of computational power on immensely bloated websites even with ad-block, with now even having to worry about agentic bullshit that I didn't ask for, and plenty of others apparently still think throwing computational cycles at cryptocurrency is good for anything.
Complaining about a relatively small performance price for Fil-C in that context honestly feels like that one famous newspaper photo of a smoking pregnant woman drinking a beer with a caption saying she's wbrried about the effects of the loud construction noises next door on her unborn child.
Except even that is wrong, because at least she had a point about the construction noises, while this is more of a "refusing to eat your vegetables" kind of situation.
Using personal websites read by a handful of programmer nerds that work fine if you turn off javascript to justify literally everyone else being forced to navigate bloated, broken company websites isn't particularly convincing as an argument against memory-safe C imo.
When Chromium and V8 are written in a memory-safe language then I might believe this.
Yes, if your JavaScript engine is written in C++, it’s going to be very hard to avoid very gross bugs. We have better options now.
The ability of adversaries to find and exploit very gross bugs in C++ codebases should have already compelled the industry to move to memory safety. Now that AI has democratized the ability to scour C++ codebases for really gross and exploitable bugs, I should think that our hands are at last being forced. I’m not impressed by what I’ve seen in the industry with respect to taking memory safety seriously.
Which is why I have NoScript in my Firefox and have gotten used to manually enabling javascript for select pages. Small price to pay.
Unfortunately the web is full of trivial websites that have no business running javascript. Recently wanted to read the famed post on Gates Notes. But for some reason Bill requires javascript to render text and images. Which reminded me Bill is not a person with good judgement on matters of IT and policy. Time saved.
Wow... I understand your point but if you feel that strong about gates using js on his personal website, it is a bit harsh isn't it? Could have multiple reasons why it is needed. Especially for someone with such a huge follower base. Lazy loading, tracking, client based adjustments, using a framework, fun [:)]... I could go on with a 100 more points why js might be needed.
That is true, but it is very basic and depending on the browser how it is implemented. On traffic heavy sites, which I assume gates blog is, js gives you full control over what get loaded when and at the same time enables tracking how far the user read the article and which parts he most likely skipped.
I am not saying that this is good, however if you have these requirements js is a valid choice.
Basically no one has a requirement to track what someone else is looking at. In fact, if not given explicit consent by the person being tracked (like they've specifically sought you tracking it for them, e.g. marking their place), we should frankly criminalize it. Mass surveillance should result in jail time.
I know that this is sarcasm, but there are people who really think this.
They get emotional (usually angry) when you tell them you disable javascript- as if every site that serves any kind of content has an automatic entitlement to run arbitrary code on your computer.
This might oversell the agency that practicioners have.
Sandboxed zero-install delivery will outcompete anything with more frictionful installs.
It's probably not the right model for a pacemaker though.
Web/JS has been a double-edged sword for FOSS: sure, I can run a free OS, but if most of my "apps" happen to be JS that I can't practically control, then I have won a battle and lost a war.
I wish Haketilo [1] would have caught on more. There's so many free JavaScript apps but we're mostly just missing a way to actually control which version or derivative of the JavaScript is run.
There's also the problem of most free apps not doing a good job of providing license info and a link to source code, but this could be sidestepped by a trusted repository which provides license info itself.
Running code by itself isn't that bad, it's the fact that browser developers have decided for some reason that this code needs to be as performant as possible, so, JIT.
I don't get it! The way JS is typically used, it doesn't even benefit from JIT all that much. Making ajax requests, doing stuff with strings, and moving DOM elements around doesn't need every CPU clock cycle to be used as optimally as possible. It's exceedingly rare for websites to actually be doing something that needs raw performance. And SPAs will be slow no matter what.
I disagree about JIT performance not mattering. I enabled "Lockdown Mode" on iOS which disables the JIT for the mentioned security reasons, and it causes a very noticeable lagginess on many sites. Of course, the primary cause is the unnecessary JS monstrosities wasting CPU cycles. But practically speaking I can say that disabling the JIT results in a very subpar experience of many JS heavy pages.
That's largely because a lot of developers have made the devil's bargain of replacing standard web stuff with badly re-implemented JS versions of same. People did it because they could, but never considered if they should.
See most of the ecosystem around React, for reference. It's idiotic that things like URL management are done in Javascript. Or form controls. I guarantee that if we stopped doing this kind of stuff, JIT wouldn't matter.
To some extent this is just saying "developers will depend upon the performance given to them", and that's true, but it's also true that as soon as things like V8 and Node appeared, JS became ubiquitous. Pandora's container, if you will.
> See most of the ecosystem around React, for reference.
I've never used React myself, but what I've heard about it makes me question my own sanity. So are you going to tell me that instead of just updating the DOM tree directly I'm going to apply the changes to my data, then pass the entire model to the framework, which would then diff it with the previous version to get the changes back out, it would then call my functions that return components, and it would then diff the virtual DOM to find out what changed, and only then would it update the actual page? Why the fuck would anyone ever want that? What's so hard about simply changing the innerText or inserting elements or whatever?
Oh and now Google and Apple are insisting that this is the way to do UIs in native apps as well, with Compose and SwiftUI respectively.
The way the front end developer community seems to largely encourage learning top-down isn't helping either. I'll forever remember that one guy we made a small project with. He learned React but had no clue what "send a request" and "pass a parameter" means, and I had to explain him how to use XHR.
> Why the fuck would anyone ever want that? What's so hard about simply changing the innerText or inserting elements or whatever?
It's so that you have the page reflecting your data at all times.
The browsers should have been written this way, instead of having byzantine update functions with all forms and a pair of *Text to rule them all. But creating it in Javascript is a really bad idea.
The DOM is the slowest part of the browser. It's not Javascript, it's the DOM. React is an attempt to manage the slowness of the DOM. One seemingly small change to a page (like setting innerText) can have many ripple effects with reflow on mamy parts of a page.
With thousands of DOM elements on a page, the DOM becomes a bottleneck. This isn't the fault of front-end developers, and it's not really the fault of browser developers. HTML/CSS/JS is a very powerful system, but it's also complex and can cost a lot of compute. When you understand this, then the reasons for React and other front-end frameworks become easier to accept.
> One seemingly small change to a page (like setting innerText) can have many ripple effects with reflow on mamy parts of a page.
I haven't looked into how browsers actually do it, but my mental model for it is that if something changes, this merely sets a flag on that element or its parent that its layout is not valid any more. Then, on next vsync, all the elements that have this flag set have their layout recalculated, potentially going up the tree as necessary. The only exception is if your script tries to get any layout-related property, e.g. offsetWidth. Then, as if as part of the getter of such a property, the layout recalculation will run immediately.
That is to say, if you need to make a lot of changes to the DOM, you should make them within one JS invocation so only one layout pass happens sometime after you're done.
OP here. The steel-man argument for React is not that it is faster at rendering. It cannot be, because it ultimately relies on the same DOM that everyone else does to do the job, and it has to set up a massive JS data structure to do what it does, which uses a lot of memory and has big GC costs. Arguments that assert that the React virtual DOM are faster than the native/shadow DOM are simply wrong [1]. Even the React team admits this [2] (though back in the day, they made a number of puffed-up claims about speed that never made sense).
The principle argument in favor of React today are developer ergonomics. People don't have to manually alter individual elements anymore -- they just describe state, and React takes care of the UI change set. On top of that, you have components, etc., that are debatably more pleasant to work with, and at the least create an ecosystem advantage for users of the framework. One can certainly see the argument for something like facebook, where there are probably dozens of different things changing independently at any given time.
But that said, one really has to question whether React makes sense anymore, given LLMs. Back when the alternative was that someone had to bespoke code every UI component, it might have been worth taking the hit of having to adopt the entire React ecosystem. But now that LLMs are writing the code, there's really no argument for developer ergonomics, and suddenly, things like "rewriting URL handling in JS" are pure liabilities.
[1] Though sadly, many front-end devs don't know this.
Well, I'm an old-school guy. I'm all for developer ergonomics, as long as they don't affect the runtime. I use PostCSS and TypeScript in my own projects precisely for this reason, because they both make things more convenient for me yet leave no trace in the finished product that the users see.
> But now that LLMs are writing the code
Hopefully that's a temporary state of affairs and everyone will eventually go back to writing code by hand. I've never even considered using an LLM to get my job done, the whole idea is as alien to me as are these types of UI frameworks. To me, the best language to describe what you want from a computer isn't English, it's a programming language.
>But now that LLMs are writing the code, there's really no argument for developer ergonomics, and suddenly, things like "rewriting URL handling in JS" are pure liabilities.
The popular coding AIs go down all the time. Last week all of them were down at the same time. If there's a bug causing losses of thousands or millions of dollars per minute, do we really want to let the LLM write incomprehensible code?
You may not need react. If you want to make the smallest possible change to the dom to reduce latency, then make the smallest possible change to the dom. Choose solidjs. (Not a sponsored post).
The problem is not url management. That should happen just once or twice during the life cycle of a page. If it takes 0.1ms or 1ms doesn't have any impact on the usability.
One of my problems was that I wanted to show data in the browser. It is a convenient delivery platform, after all. However, Chrome (and Chrome in particular) has tremendous trouble displaying large pages. A 400x400 table takes a long time to render. I could solve that in JavaScript. I had to, really.
So, as practically always, the problems stem from a combination of factors, and bad programming definitely is one of them.
That's largely because a lot of developers have made the devil's bargain of replacing standard hardware and OS primitives with badly re-implemented C versions of same. People did it because they could, but never considered if they should.
See most of the ecosystem around modern systems software, for reference. It's idiotic that things like memory layout and bit-level hardware management are done in C abstractions. I guarantee that if we stopped doing this kind of stuff, compiler optimizations wouldn't matter.
To some extent this is just saying "developers will depend upon the performance given to them", and that's true, but it's also true that as soon as things like compilers and standard libraries appeared, C became ubiquitous. Pandora's container, if you will.
> It's idiotic that things like memory layout and bit-level hardware management are done in C abstractions. I guarantee that if we stopped doing this kind of stuff, compiler optimizations wouldn't matter.
Cute, but no, not even close to a good metaphor. The C example is abstracting away fundamental complexity in a new platform. The other is completely re-writing -- in duplicate and slightly broken -- what the platform gives you for free. There's nothing about implementing form controls or URL management in JS that is more abstract. It's just different; a downstream bad decision that branches off a long tree of other bad decisions.
The equivalent level of idiocy in a C-related metaphor would be...I dunno...if you decided that you didn't like the way that header files worked, and decided to keep the C compiler, but build an external header-file management system in Fortran [1] that calls the C compiler for you. Or even closer to the JS metaphor, you shipped a special C compiler that had an embedded interpreted language that only activated at compile time, and you then used that language to allow any user to fundamentally change the syntax of C.
(It hopefully shouldn't be lost on you that this exact approach to language features has been repeatedly tried in the javascript world, including right now, with package management. But see also: typescript, coffeescript before that, Dart, etc. Javascript is a mess, and history repeats itself with regularity about every 5 years.)
[1] ...and then you re-write that about sixty times, each time being slightly incompatible with the last, and all having different fundamental incompatibilities with C headers.
Sites are slow because with all that excess performance they do more tracking, instead of keeping the website as-is.
Because that's the only thing business managers can come up with in that situation. It's a misaligned goal of users vs businesses.
In my opinion the "user agent" behavior of browsers is long gone, because they're not acting on behalf of their users anymore. They're acting on behalf of businesses.
I suspect the people who agree to buy Jira & Confluence are not particularly heavy users of them. At least, that's the only explanation I can fathom for their continued sales.
At this point SPA pretty much implies React. But even if you optimize everything the best you could and avoid any third-party runtime dependencies, it's still going to be significantly more work to make API requests and do client-side rendering vs just rendering HTML server-side.
Not always. Consider an SPA that connects via WebSockets and streams in data, adding points to a chart. The JS-less alternative would be refreshing an SVG or even the whole page once a second. The SPA is clearly more efficient here (unless someone screws it up badly).
I wouldn't consider that an SPA at all, it's just a page with an interactive element. An SPA is something that renders everything client-side and uses a generic client API to talk to the backend. A telltale sign of an SPA is that the first thing you see when you open it is some sort of loading indicator instead of the actual page you're visiting.
Right but the implication of a SPA is that it’s an application which has many logical pages, but only one real page. The logical pages are constructed by dynamically updating the DOM using JavaScript. As opposed to navigating to a new, server-provided page.
For example, a search function. For a MPA, each search query would be a new page. For a SPA, each query is a new logical page, served on the same real page.
Technically yes, a SPA may have minimal client side rendering. But then it’s not doing much of anything at all - it’s just a site. When people say SPA, they typically mean an application with client side rendering.
This reply means basically nothing to me or anyone.
To expand on what I mean, if the implication isn’t obvious: a SPA with no client side rendering is just a single HTML page. It’s a document, not an application.
So SPA naturally implies client side rendering.
The difference between a SPA and MPA isn’t the amount of pages, they both have about the same amount of logic pages. It’s about where those pages are rendered. Dynamically on the front end, or on the back end.
EDIT: okay okay to expand, my website has a contact form. With JS enabled, the form submit displays a little box that says “thank you for submitting”. With JS disabled, it navigates you to a “thank you for submitting” page.
Both are the same logic page, they have the same function. One page is just rendered client side, and one server side. Most websites or applications are hybrids. There’s very few true single page applications, and very few true multi page applications. Most SPAs have multiple real pages for different things. Most MPAs combine multiple logic pages into one real page.
By that definition, Smithereen, my fediverse server software, is also an SPA, since it does what I call "ajax navigation" on desktop, so that the notifications websocket doesn't get disconnected and reconnected every time you click a link. It's technically a single page that gets most of its content replaced at runtime when you click a link, after all, right?
I've never seen an SPA which scales properly and doesn't become a bloated mess, maybe that's possible but it's definitely harder to make it work than using traditional server side template rendering
I don't only mean "scale" in terms of users but also scale in terms of features.
So you have to guarantee that your product will stay low users and low features forever or spend a very high effort to try to partially overcome that block when you change your mind.
And guaranteeing that it will stay low features is much harder than low users I think.
In exchange for that you get a better talent pool for recruiting but does that matter if your product has to stay low scale anyways?
That's basically the comment I was just going to write but you made me not need to.
We need simpler protocols and formats, especially those that are used over the internet.
I want everyone to really start fighting for this.
I always use a browser that doesn't run any scripts (w3m) for both this reason and others.
It hurts when I see websites that don't work without js.
A bit funny though that this page is one of them so I was not able to read it.
Wikipedia is basically the most popular application of all time and it doesn't rely on javascript. People just generally don't give a shit about where their money goes.
There is no possible interpretation under which JS fits “simpler protocols and formats,” and no world in which JS could form part of a truly secure network client environment.
Before JS and WASM we had arbitrary code delivered in the form of ActiveX components, Java applets and Flash applications, which were much worse. At least now we have multiple open source implementations of the runtime.
And people ask me why I complain about web pages failing to display basic content without JS.
(I keep WASM and WebGL disabled in Firefox settings, too. Yes, I had another post ITT questioning why those things are any less secure than the JavaScript, given that they're supposed to be in a sandbox. But you know, defense in depth. It's insane that we're expected to put up with these grossly unnecessary risks all the time. Just like how it's insane that frontier models are being tested in environments that are physically capable of connecting to the Internet at large.)
Things such as WASM and WebGL should really be click-to-play, just like media files are.
I am decidedly uninterested in those features for most web pages I visit. Should they be able to spin up my CPU fan just for that I would consider it a misfeature. Just like a movie on high volume would be.
If anyone familiar with Firefox could implement that or point in the right direction, that would be most welcome.
I remember noticing this shift in nerd culture. In the early 2000s, it was common for people to say on places like Slashdot that they don't trust JavaScript and run their browser with it off. In the early 2010s, I noticed HN commenters thought this was insane, tinfoil hat type thinking.
I still run with u matrix though, and most third party requests can be limited, but I no longer have enough patience when a required page doesn't work - I'll just rely on ublock origin to work.
I say this as someone does NOT disable JS in my main browser (because like, I have a job), but also knows a fair bit about why Firefox inside Tails now restarts in some cases...
It's the classic thing. Across every gdmf metric, excluding with "true empathy", no one *gives a fuck* until it affects them, or someone within (1-3) degrees of separatation. And having broad empathy is generally a good way to get yourself labeled/astrocized: both about as obvious "compriate" and obvious "adversary".
The end of that post came out in such a mess, it must be a typo for something - "compatriot" maybe? I like the other standout neologism in there though, I can see it in a dictionary now:
In fairness, in the early 2000s they were probably right. Early browser security model was a bit of a mess. The fact that this article is even talked about is a sign of how much better things are.
It's so ubiquitous and unavoidable at this point.. I was at a conference lecture in 2020 where someone was suggesting disabling JavaScript and I thought the same thing— how absurd. The times have really changed...
What would that even look like? What is "benign"? The browser environment already has pretty strict rules for what the JS can do. It's not allowed to read your files, see your webcam without permission, know about other tabs or windows etc.
The problem here is that the browser failed to correctly implement those rules. If the chromium team cannot do that, what makes you think they can implement any other kind of "benign code" verification with zero bugs?
To give an example that goes beyond what you already suggested:
You can prove that your code terminates (or rather responds to events in a finite time, even if the event loop itself runs forever.) Or you can even prove that your code reacts quickly, ie within some time limit. You can also prove memory limits.
> The problem here is that the browser failed to correctly implement those rules. If the chromium team cannot do that, what makes you think they can implement any other kind of "benign code" verification with zero bugs?
Defense in depth. And you can have competing implementations relatively easily for this, and another way to find and report bugs. Especially if the verifier is open source.
The verifier itself can be pretty simple: it's the prover that's complicated and needs smarts, but that's being run on the author's computer, not in the user's browser.
Rubbish, it was a great decision. So many websites wouldn't have been possible otherwise - Google maps, YouTube, ChatGPT, WhatsApp, etc. etc.
Do you remember what the alternative was? Flash, Java, ActiveX. No thank you.
Sure security is difficult but vulnerabilities of this magnitude are rare. If anything the lesson is don't write highly security sensitive software in C/C++.
Fortunately I disabled js by default. Unfortunately, it breaks about 30% of the web. Including nvd.nist.gov, which shows a completely blank page without js enabled, even though with js it’s just a simple page with only static content.
The problem is that a lot of frontend web dev is driven by the React ecosystem which requires you to have SSR figured out for "no js on the client" to even partially work, which, if you ever tried to go all the way (e.g. RR v7 w/ full SSR) in a not-a-toy project, is not easy to set up and think about by any means, because your server has to be a js one at which point your entire server-side solution consist of node or node-like js server, postgres or mysql (with pooled connections through something like mysql2 and probably drizzle), something for caching like Redis, some complex process manager like pm2... i say complex because if you want to have a high performance fault tolerant gracefully restarting automatic new code deploying system ... and all of that with caching layer(s), Redis sending cache updates without you polling etc., you have to implement and test these yourself... Everything async and thinking in long term running processes and thinking about the async loop instead of a "php-like" model. Components being a potential source of memory leaks, thinking about components having to work on client and server environments, keeping SSR performance (in the sense of component rendering complexity) up etc.
This is not something just anyone is going to rush into. Bigger teams or js/ts evangelists will eventually arrive at that point if they're running something where no-js (really a side effect of seo goals) is important, but "normal people" will spend this time and engineering effort elsewhere.
I think the industry in general is moving past React, as now, and definitely in near future, the only thing that matters is ideas, the rest is for the LLMs to figure out, and so the "frameworks" are going to completely disappear from people's minds as "programming" essentially becomes "telling the AI what to do" and the AI writes asm or even binary. That is when, no JS, may become more viable again lol.
People, including me, resist it, but in the future "programming" is not going to be about writing code (or even checking it, we're way too slow and error-prone to do that), but about coming up with ideas of how to capture real world problems in an IT system, and how to solve those problems by existing (or novel) ways, picking the right tools for the job (say a statistician picking the fitting metric to capture some property of the system that will actually project meaningful observability improvements and not be "just a bunch of noise") and making the right architectural decisions in terms of correctness, performance, scope, taking into account deadlines and budget. And being the domain model glue. Everything else, all the nitty gritty we used to call programming, all the <insert a quadrillion of CS jargon keywords>, is going to be done by AI ... it's a mag 9.5 quake tsunami and it can't be stopped now.
This might completely wipe out things like React (which are largely made for humans writing the code, not for humans consuming the output of that code) faster than anyone thought possible.
I think my subjective feeling is in that ballpark, yes. There are of course many sites that are more like web apps that require js, but those are relatively trusted, I added exceptions for them long ago. For sites that I visit for the first time, I think more than half still work to some extent. Maybe they are slightly broken, but at least I can read the page. I’d say around 20–30% of the web even gets _better_, because you don’t get ads or cookiewalls. But then there are also many sites that just remain a blank page, not even showing a message that js is required. (And as the sibling comment points out, recently Anubis is also becoming more common; maybe in recent months it’s closer to 40–50% unusable.) When I hit that, often I am reminded that I wasn’t that interested anyway, and I close the tab. So maybe it’s more than 30% that breaks, and a more accurate statement would be “of the sites where I ended up reading a page, I had to opt in to js about 30% of the time”.
Right, Anubis is a fair point, that has for sure been rising in recent months. Often when I get an Anubis page, I am reminded that I was doomscrolling and that I did not want to see the page that badly anyway, and I close the tab.
How many Heartbleeds[1] must software users and our national security interests endure before the industry treats memory safety as a best practice for systems with exposure to the Internet?
The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains:
> When a memory buffer is accessed using the wrong type, it could read or write memory out of the bounds of the buffer
Memory safety is specifically intended to prevent errors like these from becoming arbitrary out-of-bounds memory access and native code execution. Even type safety --- from the 1970s --- can prevent type confusion.
The CISA and the NSA have called for the adoption of memory-safe languages.[3] We exercise poor engineering judgment and poor ethics, as an industry, when we continue to expose users to classes of wholly avoidable security weaknesses in Internet-facing software.
If including JIT in a system renders its developer incapable of guaranteeing memory safety, then perhaps that developer’s approach to JIT is not yet mature enough to ethically distribute to non-technical consumers who are not positioned to evaluate that their security is being traded off by the developer on their behalf.
We’re past the era where security issues emanating from memory-unsafe code were tolerated due to being unavoidable — continuing to expose your software’s users to them in this present day and age is simply a choice.
Type confusion bugs exist in Rust programs too, the language does not eliminate all such issues (though it does help somewhat). I think it would be more prudent to wait until we have details before getting on the soapbox.
You probably need a programming language more powerful than Rust that can encode and check the complicated invariants needed by the JIT.
There are classes of type system—"dependently-typed"—where you can encode arbitrary predicates into the type checking. I've remember seeing examples where they could prove arbitrary facts at the assembly level, including self-modifying code. Lean is such a language, currently very popular, but there are others.
Correctness of such programs depends on some basic assumptions about the CPU/memory environment, which should work absent hardware bugs like speculative execution or side channels. Although these could probably be encoded as well, and accounted for.
Without such a general proof language, you could probably make a special language to support JIT development, although its type system would be very complicated and the language itself could be a source of bugs.
Given such languages or proofs (maybe tractable now with AI-assisted theorem proving), you can actually make insanely performant code, since you don't really need to rely on other runtime protection so much (although maybe a good idea still).
Not to downplay the severity (patch your browsers!), but there have been 5-10 actively-exploited V8 type confusion vulnerabilities in the last year. I'd be curious if this one blew up because it was the only one that was posted, or if it barely crossed some line in the collective consciousness this time around.
They just released a CVE for a garbage truck vulnerability where an attacker could brick the vehicle by exploiting the telemetry system these things now have preinstalled in factory.
That's how the system or browser should be configured. Secure by default and any insecurity must be an opt-in. But Google won't do it because their websites are JS heavy monster trucks and millions of websites run their tracking scripts which require JIT enabled by default for optimal page load.
> Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
So it was fixed in 152.0.7977.82 (before .83), if I read that right.
There’s a reason I use Firefox (Gecko). Also, Ladybird—another completely different web engine—is really promising. I spent five hours building it from source, having it take about 8 gigabytes of space, and it perfectly renders my own webpages and blogs.
I have a feeling someone’s going to make an open source browser using Ladybird’s engine before Ladybird has official binaries.
The reason why I support Gecko and Ladybird’s engine is because I am opposed to monoculture, however. Even if Gecko (Firefox) is less secure than Chromium (Chrome, Edge, etc.), by not having a monoculture, a Chrome exploit will only take down the subset of people using the Chromium ecosystem, and not affect Gecko users. Alas, most people are in the Chromium ecosystem right now so that means malicious hackers only need to target one codebase.
It’s the same reason I wrote MaraDNS back in 2001—back then, there was only one open source DNS server[1,2] so I wrote another one.[3]
[1] Djbdns was around back then but wasn’t open source, which limited its adoption.
[2] MaraDNS was and is optimized for running at most a few dozen domains on a system running a bunch of other services, where one does not want the DNS server causing security problems for the server, and where the DNS server needs to be lightweight as possible.
If it's in the CISA known exploited vulnerabilities catalog, tell me if I'm wrong but I assume people don't go around exploiting million dollar 0-days in public just to fuck around safely in a chrome sandbox.
So maybe we're going to see another CVE for the sandbox escape soon?
There's a risk that someone had been sitting on a sandbox escape that assumed having RCE inside the sandbox first, and so they'd been waiting for an RCE exactly like this one.
Those folks would not be disclosing their sandbox escape unless they were good guys.
You should add a disclaimer that you are the CEO of Fil-C. /s
In the context of this vulnerability, I doubt memory safety would have made much of a difference.
This is a great reminder though, currently doing a full userspace replacement on my 3D printer and Fil-C might be just what I need for the irreplaceable C parts.
Crypto mining would be one application. But also, combined with a sandbox escape would make it particularly devastating. Usually full control of a device takes at least two exploits given the layers of security present in OS and browser environments.
It seems like the Chromium issue on their bugboard, which presumably would have the example HTML and vuln patch, is blocked from being viewed. Is this because making it public increases the risk of exploitation?
"Google has confirmed that an exploit exists in the wild but has not disclosed information about the threat actors, targeted organizations, or attack campaigns while the update is still rolling out."
> Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)
What's the difference between "executing arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page" and running whatever is in the <script> tag?
In the script tag you only have access to JS. This allows you to escape JS and have native code execution. It is still sandboxed by os-level primitives, but it is an escalation/first step in successful exploitation.
> You would think that an engineering school would be wiser...
Schools are a business run by administrative staff who make purchasing decisions to solve business problems. Schools love to reduce billable teaching hours through online coursework, which invites academic dishonesty from students, and paying for honorlock is a way to achieve that reduction in expenditure, rather than paying tutors to supervise exams in person.
I would guess it's now trivial for attackers to have an llm analyse every new commit to chromium repo linking to an issue that's 403 for security reasons, but maybe I'm missing something.
What do CVEs like this one mean for the likes of fly.io and cloudflare who use V8 for sandboxing 3p workloads? I guess they have some degree of KYC and some hardening outside the sandbox, but chaining this with a container escape running under a free tier account could pwn the host.
You can just ask ChatGPT these questions these days, but it was a fun read:
fly.io depends on Firecracker microVMs, so you should be concerned if you're running untrusted code, but not concerned about other people interacting with you wrt v8.
Cloudflare depends on v8 isolates, which depend on the trustworthiness of the v8 sandbox, which is a non-trivial hurdle, but not an insurmountable one for attackers with the resources to have a v8 bug in the first place.
Just outta curiosity because I can't find it at a cursory look - what exactly would be the type (coersion?) that would allow v8 to execute arbitrary code? Is this like something in post data to nodejs that terminates early and is able to run exec or something, like unto a sql injection?
The Chromium issue is not public yet, so let's go with a very simple example.
Let's say that you have a type confusion bug that (in terms of the interpreted language) allows you to use an Integer variable as an Array.
That sounds nonsensical when just considering the high-level language, but your computer is going to need something to work with when running a script. For an Integer variable it will for example store the value, and for an Array it would store a pointer to a data area (and that area then contains values).
Now, if the interpreter loses track of which type a certain variable is, then it will also not know whether to interpret the internal data as a plain value (arbitrarily chosen by the script/attacker) or a pointer to well-formed data (carefully chosen by the runtime).
As an immediate step, letting the attacker use an address of their choosing for array operations would allow them to read and write arbitrary memory that is reachable with this form of addressing.
I'm putting specific emphasis on "form of addressing" here, because the v8 authors have considered this possibility and put additional protections in place. Within the sandbox, "addresses" are limited to a size of 32 bits, and address within a dedicated 4 Gigabyte area that is specifically for interpreter data. Within that area you are not going to find a lot of critical data to affect outside operations, you'd have to find a way to escape that memory area first.
The next part is going to be a bit hazy because it's been some time since I did Chromium exploitation, and getting code execution within the sandbox from data writes is itself not an easy task.
Now, we have established that there is not a lot of terribly important data within the 4 GB area. The data managing the interpreter lives outside, and any JITed code will also live outside because it needs different access permissions. We only really get to play with Objects and their data.
Objects handling executable code are rare, but there are a few that are at least adjacent. Last time I checked, WASM was one feasible choice where you get reasonably predictable results with custom data, as it included a pointer to actual executable code that represents the WASM program.
Under the assumption that the WASM interpreter/compiler does its job correctly the full block of executable code will not be very interesting. However, any integer constant in the program will end up somewhere within the executable code, and that would give you enough controllable data to encode one or two arbitrary instructions and a relative jump to the next integer constant. To start execution at the first integer constant, we'd then just modify the Object data of the WASM program to slightly offset the entrypoint.
And that's the short form of a possible (and likely outdated) way of getting semi-arbitrary code execution within the sandbox (as we are running as a WASM program, and therefore have all the usual syscall restrictions and other security features engaged).
It sounds technically possible to build a JIT where a verifier checks that the JIT-generated code is correctly pizlonated before allowing it to become executable. :)
One might argue that verifying the correctness of a JIT is basically the same problem as verifying the correctness of an entire compiler, with the added caveat that malicious inputs to the JIT are expected whereas malicious inputs to a compiler might be seen as rare.
IIRC rustc still has a couple of known soundness bugs, for example. It’s only been a few weeks since someone managed to exploit Lean, and Lean is all about formalizing things :)
WebKit's JS engine (JavaScriptCore) is super friendly to pointer capabilities. I did not have to change much to make it use the Fil-C GC instead of its own GC and to make it use a capability per JS object.
On the other hand, Chromium's JS engine (V8) does a bunch of crazy stuff with pointer encoding, so the best you could do there is probably a single arena for the whole JS heap.
Also, JavaScriptCore has a well-supported mode that involves not only zero JIT but a fully portable C++ interpreter. Not sure V8 has that.
That finally convinced me getting data using functions (accessors, getters, setters) is a good thing, even in C :) Just all that unnecesary if's are so annoing and killing performance...
It's because User Interaction is Required. CVSS 10 would be the case where everyone can be exploited without interaction.
Interestingly the 8.8 is more alert-worthy than the 9.8 and 10 cvss, because there is a need to be alerted of the current security risk, whereas with a cvss 2 vuln, there is nothing to be done by users, only admins.
Google has the means and ability to rewrite Chromium ; bug for bug in Rust from C++ using Astra & Fable.
Same for the Linux kernel. Considering the Fermat's Last Theorem lean proof was 13MLoC and cost $300,000 it would cost $2M to rewrite Chromium & Linux in Rust going purely of combined LoC.
As somebody who prefers to browse with JS off whenever possible, there's something absurd about the balance everyone takes for granted between (A) your personal safety against a devastating hack by malicious code and (B) surveillance advertising.
"Sorry, but to enter this shop you need to take one of the used syringes from that pile some dude delivers every day and poke yourself with it."
This seems irrelevant as the issue talks about being exploitable with a crafted HTML page, no mention of JS. If true, you would be able to be hit without js enabled.
It mentions a type confusion in V8. Is it possible to trigger that without JS enabled?
The "all chromium versions" part of the title is also misleading, most browser CVEs do not distinguish between "untested lower bound" vs "affects all" (even though it seems like it'd be trivial to bisect).
What exactly does "RCE inside sandbox" describe that goes beyond "the webpage can supply arbitrary JavaScript and the JavaScript engine executes it", but is still isolated from the system?
Chrome runs webpages in individual sandbox processes with very low privileges, as a defense-in-depth strategy. It generally requires at least two exploits to actually affect a user--first, get RCE in a sandboxed process, then find a separate vulnerability that lets you escape the sandbox process entirely. For this bug to have actually been used in the wild, there was almost certainly a second bug as well.
It means it can execute native code inside the sandbox, as opposed to Javascript. While still sandboxed, this lets it access some parts of the attack surface that JS would not have been able to, some of which may have other exploits that allow escaping the rest of the way.
I think people would like to understand what the "sandbox" is here and what isolation does it provide, is it an unprivileged process? something chromium specific? a v8/JS thing? etc.
Among other things, JavaScript in the browser has no way to even express "kill PID 1234 on the user's machine" or "list the contents of `C:\Users\Documents` and upload all of the files" or "spawn cmd.exe on the user's machine". How would you even do these things if you could run any JavaScript in the browser? You can't.
However, chrome.exe itself does because it's a native application, as is the sandboxed JavaScript interpreter inside of chrome.exe.
(This is a very oversimplified explanation but I think this is the disconnect people are having)
> JavaScript in the browser has no way to even express ... "list the contents of `C:\Users\Documents` and upload all of the files"
this is besides the point, but javascript has the file system api.
anyways to your broad point, i dont think this is convincing. What's the difference between not having an api vs having an api that is disabled (e.g. the syscall exists but is filtered). Either way you are not taking the action. RCE in the sandbox is an important step in the bigger exploit chain, but not because you can express things in the traditional syscalls inside the sandbox.
Because Javascript theoretically can't just access files on disk. Control over the render would let you do that, if not for the process level sandbox, which constraints things like file access, system, calls, etc.
But the process is still more capable than the VM. The process can talk to other processes via IPC, for example.
That's why you don't go from "javascript -> computer is taken over", instead you go from "javascript -> renderer control -> computer is taken over".
because with proper code exec you can trigger other bugs to escalate beyond the sandbox, whereas with JS you'd have to find a bug to escape from JS to native
can't get a proper ios/Android RCE with just JS code exec
Memory isolation having one tab or account open on your bank and another on this page does not mean it could leak across the sandbox and steal bank account details but anything inside of your general page content can be lost
This doesn't affect the score though, the reason there's 1.2 points less than the max is because there is a Required User Interaction. The user needs to visit a specific html page.
Even with the sandbox protection layer, the rest of the parameters are maxed out.
I don't know why this is being downvoted. This is called malvertising and its one of the most significant vectors for exploiting a vulnerability like this. Its happened multiple times over the last two decades.
My read of Google's disclosure is that there is likely no known escape from the sandbox. I don't agree this would be reported this way just because "user action" like "using web browser" is required. Even if this individual CVE is correctly an 8.8 there would be a critical assessment of a known chain. The only reason there wouldn't be, would be if the other vulnerability is known to Google but has no patch yet.
$1k for this vuln is laughable. If the researcher wrote an exploit as the nday exploit devs did and sold it in the gray market they would of got significantly more.
No, it is a limit on free speech but it is one of several that various governments (and cultures as a whole) throughout the world have upheld fairly consistently. Free speech is more or less an unachievable platonic ideal that we aspire to. Success varies, as do the compromises made along the way.
Speaking more generally, don't let your ideals bias your judgment. Just because you support policy X and also view ideal Y as good that doesn't mean that X isn't detrimental to Y. It's important to be objective about these things.
I don’t disagree, two or more things can be true at once.
That said I still use Firefox for other reasons.
I simply don’t trust google, I don’t trust Mozilla either but I do trust them more than Google and you do kinda have to have a browser to function in the modern world.
Despite what people are saying here, chrome has a really excellent track record. Nobody is perfect. Switching just because chrome got exploited one time will likely result in you switching to something worse.
well one someone posts on an article about an exploit in chrome saying that the exploit is a reason to switch, i think its fair to say its not about "not reward[ing] unethical behaviour"
Actually thinking back, I get _more_ content, because there's a notable number of access screens that just don't function with JS off, leaving the whole article available.
The only scenario in which one could possibly argue this is if the option is using MV3 uBlock Origin Lite in basic mode, where the browser handles the content blocking just reading rules from uBoL.
uBO MV2 and MV3 in any of the higher two modes objectively add more attack surface when the alternative is basic uBoL + DNS level filtering which is the most secure combination second to just DNS-only filtering.
And ultimately ad blocking is only badness enumeration which is a poor security measure to rely on, especially when the main application (Firefox) lacks proper security measures versus Chromium. It’s like the NVIDIA owners coming up with 3,000 different cable solutions to the burning connectors when its a problem with the card itself.
This is missing the point. The whole point of a "sandbox" in the sense of defense in depth is precisely because it's expected that first-line security guarantees will be broken. Like, maybe V8 has a bug and you can write Javascript that fools it into running arbitrary binary code. But that's less dangerous, because the V8 engine runs in a process sandbox and doesn't have access to the rest of the browser state.
Which is exactly what happened here, as it turns out. This isn't a breakout (or isn't alleged to be a breakout) to the broader OS, only to the sandbox environment.
According to the Chrome release page (https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel...), Google paid a researcher $1000 for ethically reporting this.
The CVE associated with it (CVE-2026-85046) is already being exploited in the wild. If we put our thinking caps on, how much do you think this vulnerability is actually worth? How much do you think an organization like Google would spend on, for example, AI tokens or compute to detect this internally before it was found and exploited in the wild?
Ethical disclosure is a complicated topic, because researchers shouldn't hold bugs for ransom or demand high payment. But at the same time, if someone submits a critical issue like this, it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth. Why should a researcher be effectively penalized for responsibly telling a vendor instead of selling the bug to a "research firm" or three-letter agency?
It's one thing if you're an open source project maintainer just trying to put something out to the community. The math is a lot different if you're Google.
Further: a vulnerability is probably not worth that much either, even if it's a hypercapable vulnerability, because the grey market buys full enablement kits, not vulnerability information. People making 6 figures on vulnerabilities are selling fully enabled full chain exploit systems, not just intelligence about a sandbox escape.
[0]: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=44861106
AP recommends spaces around them, whereas Chicago doesn’t
besides if we’re critiquing incorrect following of English orthography
—Sentences should be capitalized
—The word “don’t” requires an apostrophe
—End sentences with a period
—That’s incorrect usage of an em-dash at the end there — but what does it matter anyways ;)
I hate that it's basically become the little hitler moustache of punctuation. There was at least one guy who was really enjoying his tiny little moustache until he couldn't anymore. That is the emdash for me.
Legendary.
Miss that shit too.
Ez way to shit on Windows users who had to double up endashes like they were impoverished.
I guess in your analogy the double endash is Stalin’s mustache and the Soviet Union in general - Gaudy, excessive, starving for more
1. (. . . Modern American Usage) https://i.vgy.me/UYqs89.png
Bug bounties are as much a way of attracting talent to even try to exploit your system as they are about the exploits themselves. If you lowball the bounties the talent goes elsewhere.
We shouldn't look to the black market as cost discovery for these vulnerabilities, most non-criminal researchers are not putting up an ask order and letting the black market compete with Google.
We absolutely should. One of the points of bug bounties is to discourage people from selling to the black market.
Google is only paying for the vulnerability; the exploit market is also paying for your mortal soul.
I had a friend that worked in the space. He lived an exciting life; I hope he's still alive..
‘Officer, you can’t arrest me for carrying a gold bar!’
‘I can if you are carrying it out of the Federal Reserve vault without permission’
Similarly:
‘Surely selling someone the knowledge that a piece of software can be hacked isn’t illegal?’
‘It is if you know or suspect that that person’s intention is to use that knowledge to commit crimes’
This would make you a ‘coconspirator’ or possibly an ‘accessory before the fact’ in any crimes they committed.
A hardline bargaining position with Google would be more like "pay me what I want, or else I'll give it to all takers on the black market for maximum damage". That would be unethical and probably illegal to boot but it's a better definition of value than "1$ greater than max bid".
The value of something is dictated by what _the market_ offers, and just because Google throws a lowball price because _they_ don't value it doesn't necessarily mean that the value of the exploit itself is as low as they dictate.
There will always be someone who would screw Google just for the love of the game, and if they got a better price from elsewhere, I don't see why _morality_ would really play that big of a role. It all comes down to incentives, and if Google doesn't incentivize doing the good thing enough, then someone _will_ incentivize them to do the bad thing just a bit more.
Markets are fundamental things and exist regardless of any kind of moral "should". Otherwise we wouldn't have people buying hard drugs or trafficing women.
Google should, as a rational actor, pay out better for legitimate vulnerabilities that pose actual risk to them to avoid such a situation.
My beef here is that morality and ethics are only assigned to the researchers.
Which means that they have zero concern from this incident about reputational damage to themselves or their browser. That's pretty good circumstantial evidence of a monopolistic practice, when you can safely assume that there's effectively no difference to your bottom line if your software is hacked.
This should have been done a long time ago.
Firefox, and the browser market would be much more healthy. Btw, Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, now even Twitter/SpaceX and all of these should have been forced the same way. And of course not just in this field, but all of them, like oil companies. They can pivot, of course, with some grace period, but that would mean giving up something at the end.
And if we are there, we can abolish most of trade secrecy too, which exists only to keep up the status quo while hindering progress.
If people want a better internet, they can start fostering one, rather than endlessly complain that someone else should be fostering it for them.
There will probably be upwards of 1000 people who read this comment that have used Google services for 15+ years, never loaded a single ad, and complain about Google ruining the internet. Please, pick-up a mirror. Nobody wants to build a competitor to serve your cheap ass
Search Engine have chicken and egg problem, you can only have a good search if enough people use it to tune the ranking and see enough search spam cases.
“Just compete with a monopoly on their own field with one hand tied behind”
This comment in general, not aimed at you.
There are hundreds of us, hundreds.
So, the most likely case is that they're greedy and miserly, and hope we don't do the math. However I recognize that there are judgment calls to be made here. Either their internal spending finds hundreds of RCEs per year, or they're significantly discounting bounty payments versus their actual worth, or they're negligent in budgeting for RCE discovery at all, or they assign zero value to the security of the Chromium platform underpinning Edge, Electron, et al. All of these are bad in different ways; one hopes a competent tech reporter actually pursues this line of questioning with them!
I generally agree, but a 3rd explanation is they figure that too generous a bounty will flood them with reports of minor issues making major ones harder to see (and costing time and money to verify that could be spent looking for security issues).
* They pay for vulnerabilities without reliable exploits (more for vulnerabilities that are demonstrably reliable).
* They don't require you to actually build a reliable exploit chain.
* They pay up front, not in tranches.
* They work with essentially all comers, unlike the grey market, where you're generally subcontracting to sell your first few.
Sound very interesting!
There's also a couple of Darknet Diaries episodes with similar interviews.
If old systems had no bugs/issues, companies could do without the maintenance burden altogether (which includes even systems not being evolved/extended).
But they weren't security issues necessarily. I never thought about it, fixing a huge performance issue is big. A security fix that gets caught early makes no noise so you just don't know how important it would have been. We also once had a really terrible bug that lead to lots of customers getting effectively attacked.
Potentially creates a misaligned incentive to intentionally hide bugs in the code you write so that later you can fix it and get the bounty.
"Safety" is also a relative thing, when the world is safer for one party, it is usually worse for another.
99.999% of people will agree that reducing software vulnerabilities is desirable if they're able to understand the question, including the bad actors themselves a lot of the times.
The situations like bad state actors are already not bound by laws, and things like keeping activism legal are better fought for through other ways
Yeah let's see how this plays out, paying people less than their time is worth for RCEs.
"Making money from bugs" is not solely a black-market activity. There are plenty of grey and even white hat activities in this market.
Now exploiting them? Yes that's a crime.
Aka security research.
It's one thing to hold something for ransom ("give me $5M or I release the 0day"). It's another to sell a valuable piece of information ("give me $5M if you want the 0day"). As long as you're only offering the bug to the company who would be impacted by its release, there's nothing unethical about asking for payment.
Maybe you think that, ethically, all bugs should be reported, regardless of payment, because it prevents harm. Well a lot of things prevent harm that we don't all take it upon ourselves to do voluntarily. Should everyone do all safety-related work for free? If we don't want to do it for free, should we not do safety work at all?
If the company really wanted it safe, and they can't make it safe themselves, they can pay someone else to make it safe. If they aren't willing to do that, then nobody is obligated to do free work for them, because we don't require anyone else to do safety-critical work for free. Let's not forget, this isn't a scrappy startup struggling for a seed round, this is one of the world's largest corporations with billions of dollars in cash. If they want your labor, make them pay for it.
Thanks for putting it like that, it changed my opinion on the subject.
If it's normal to expect people to be compensated for other security work, it implies it should also be normal to compensate security researches.
No it’s not lol
There's no way money is the motivator.
... than Google?
> Selling to Google though you aren't chancing jail time.
Why would you go to jail for selling a vulnerability? It's free speech.
Not so much for taking money from someone who the buyer should know has no reason to be interested in buying the information. And either you know who your counterparty is, in which case you know that they are using it nefariously, or you don't know who your counterparty is, in which case you know that they are using it nefariously. Any court and any jury should see straight through this.
Similarly if you figure out how to get the ATM down the street to give you free money, and you "accurately describe the bug" to people who pay you, and they use it to steal money from the ATM, expect to be charged for participating in, and in fact being an instrumental enabler of their crime. Because it is beyond all reasonable doubt that you could've believed they could have been interested enough to pay you for any other reason.
Since it's all so legal and risk-free, you'd think selling an exploit for a million bucks would be quite the feather in their cap!
It may also be helpful to visualize being interviewed by the FBI and being asked "Did you sell this exploit? To whom? How much did you receive? For what purpose did you think it would be used?". And to remember they already know the answers to these questions, and lying to the FBI is also a crime.
Isn't that a good thing?
> However it is now clear that all bugs that can be found will be found. So this makes a ton of sense.
If Google can find all the bugs nowadays, presumably with AI, why still pay a bug bounty? At least by this logic, bug bounties make less sense now.
Even a resume item.
Remember that you can sell the same vulnerability to multiple people: it's software you can copy.
$1k is so dumb and the fact we’re discussing auctions is proof (hello, Sundar, what you doing over there?).
Guess this will change after the next e.g. nationwide hospital ransomware by a hacker who publicly laments bounty rates, if the news cycle accommodates the story long enough.
Negotiating with terrorists or black mailers is a bad idea.
> allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*
A bug in V8 leads to code execution in Chrome's web page process. It does not lead to execution in general. For that you need other exploits that escape the web page process. Those are not detailed here. This CVE is not a big deal. You're responding the poster's title, not the actual CVE
https://serotav.github.io/Writeups/v8/when-sorting-leads-to-...
that's why bugs in the webpage process pay out very little. Without a worse 2nd bug, they are less serious. Bugs that let you RCE outside the webpage process pay much higher.
Having just a Sandbox RCE is neat, I've got some on my laptop currently, but it's just a piece of the puzzle.
It's insulting how poorly incentivised white hats are, just look at how much North Korea is raking in with their cyber shenanigans - current estimates put it at around $6.75 billion to date (over the past 10 years or so).
nothing will change until big tech can no longer rip off security researchers
advocating for this is much more ethical than donating money to Google. I'd rather have that money go my family than a multi trillion dollar company.
of course it could be a colleague or someone with access to such tools
from what I remember, they also don't pay it all out at once but rather over time where the payments stop if the bug gets patched.
I don't understand why you're being so cocky here? this is how many 0 click exploits are sourced
On average, probably not that much. What's the amortized cost of all testing, static analysis, and audit / code review, per "prevented potential bug"?
It’s natural to feel cognitive dissonance because the value to the vendor is so disproportionate to the potential harm to users, but the incentive structure is what it is.
A vulnerability which lets an attacker harm the vendor has much higher direct financial value.
I'd point out that part of the reason the grey and black market pays so well is because it is that type of market. You have to pay people extra to look past their morals and a risk premium against potential reputational and legal consequences.
That said, the gap is probably not just that.
Someone could sell it on the black market, sell it to Google, or just move on with their life and not sell it.
I don't know what this is worth on the black market, maybe I'd be scammed by even trying to sell it. Maybe I don't want to be a bad person. These are all things that go into the prices
In the world where security issues are paid for entirely at market rate, it would also be very important to not use browsers by poor groups because they would be unable to pay for security reports on the market and consequently the browsers would be less secure.
Interesting idea, for sure, but I don't think it lands in a place I want to go since I neither desire stochastic payments nor desire that all browsers should be from large corporations.
How many PMs are making more than bug bounties to fetch coffee and bagels?
Their priorities are all out of order.
Why not? Capitalism requires they maximize their value. These profitable companies lay bare at the altar, so they should understand the requirements of their god.
What? That's not how you calculate the value of something at all.
The value is not based on the prevention, it's the cost of the cure.
> viewed it as insurance
Of course. Beyond the ethics, the social obligation, sleeping well at night by compensating hardworking people fairly.
“We can’t pay more or we’d have to hire more human reviewers” should never be a massive company’s line of thinking.
Total rewards given $81,933,423
https://bughunters.google.com/about/rules/chrome-friends/chr...
Like look at CVEs curl dealt with at one point that were just completely bogus and given huge severity ratings to start with.
But honestly if you’re the one proposing a “simple solution” maybe do some research yourself.
It's an off the cuff idea on a nerd forum. Relax buddy.
why? google removed don't be evil off their charter a long time ago. why shouldn't security researchers also seek to maximize profits?
Why not?
"Hey, I found a cvss 8.8 bug in chrome that allows arbitrary code execution when loading my http url. For X USD I can send a report along, and for Y USD I can send a commit with the fix."
Sounds like a basic contract to me
What I do think is ethically dubious is:
"Hey I found this bug and I will MAKE IT PUBLIC WITHIN 90 DAYS SO LOOK AT IT"
I know it's a convention from 'security researchers', but I think the first approach is more ethical than the latter.
in the darkweb, due to crypto, a lot. there is where the $ is, whether it's stealing crypto directly or phishing developers.
I mean, why not?
Hell no, the same level bugs at Google should be enthusiastically paid way more than from an undercapitalized startup, who actually needs the help more so. Should be orders of magnitude difference in relation to scale.
>it makes sense to pay them what the bug's actually worth.
Honest fair-dealing should come into play at least but there are some players who have struck it so rich they can now take enough pride to pay an additional premium just because they can, and their good human nature almost compels them ethically to do way more than the minimum.
Just apparently not at Google.
If a company has achieved financial success to a degree that they are no longer worried about complete failure for the foreseeable future, then it's only a matter of generosity vs Scrooge-like behavior.
What's missing from their overall business acumen if they can't even afford to project an image of generosity yet?
If they're not actively making a serious effort to pay the maximum they can well afford for bugs that are truly serious, there is a technical term for that. Chickenshit.
That said, I think that the V8 team has done a fantastic job of securing their engine. Their heap sandbox feature is really inspiring! It's really wild that (as far as I can understand this issue) someone is able to bypass it.
(Posted from a memory safe browser - WebKit MiniBrowser compiled with Fil-C. Pretty sure this is safer than even V8 and the heap sandbox.)
It’s only very heavy calculations that see a boost in performance. But, realistically, how many websites require this or currently use this today? <1%? Maybe <.1%?
This is pretty typical across JIT engines, too. PHP also sees only a slight increase in performance from the JIT. Because of the nature of PHP applications, most time is spend on the network and database. Only very CPU-heavy code sees a significant speed up.
That’s even the case for C#, which is why the dotnet runtime only conditionally JIT compiles code. Only hot path code is eligible for JIT compilation.
It still uses a WKWebView today, even in the EU, despite Apple now allowing alternative browser engines in the EU as of 2 years ago.
I'm sure Chrome will eventually ship Blink+V8 in the EU. It will take some time
It's easy to be safer, as long as performance can be sacrificed for it.
Complaining about a relatively small performance price for Fil-C in that context honestly feels like that one famous newspaper photo of a smoking pregnant woman drinking a beer with a caption saying she's wbrried about the effects of the loud construction noises next door on her unborn child.
Except even that is wrong, because at least she had a point about the construction noises, while this is more of a "refusing to eat your vegetables" kind of situation.
It took over two years and help from contributors to get to the point where WebKit could be made fully memory safe.
Yes, if your JavaScript engine is written in C++, it’s going to be very hard to avoid very gross bugs. We have better options now.
The ability of adversaries to find and exploit very gross bugs in C++ codebases should have already compelled the industry to move to memory safety. Now that AI has democratized the ability to scour C++ codebases for really gross and exploitable bugs, I should think that our hands are at last being forced. I’m not impressed by what I’ve seen in the industry with respect to taking memory safety seriously.
I also cringe at projects that "compile C to WASM" and then believe that it is immediately "memory-safe". (It really is not.)
The only exception for C/C++ projects is Fil-C which that is memory-safe. New projects at this point should just consider using Rust instead.
Sir, do you happen to have instructions for doing this? We who benefit from your philanthropy salute you.
Which is why I have NoScript in my Firefox and have gotten used to manually enabling javascript for select pages. Small price to pay.
Unfortunately the web is full of trivial websites that have no business running javascript. Recently wanted to read the famed post on Gates Notes. But for some reason Bill requires javascript to render text and images. Which reminded me Bill is not a person with good judgement on matters of IT and policy. Time saved.
There not a lot of reason to not have at least a fallback to serve your text-only content without JS.
They get emotional (usually angry) when you tell them you disable javascript- as if every site that serves any kind of content has an automatic entitlement to run arbitrary code on your computer.
This might oversell the agency that practicioners have.
Sandboxed zero-install delivery will outcompete anything with more frictionful installs.
It's probably not the right model for a pacemaker though.
Web/JS has been a double-edged sword for FOSS: sure, I can run a free OS, but if most of my "apps" happen to be JS that I can't practically control, then I have won a battle and lost a war.
There's also the problem of most free apps not doing a good job of providing license info and a link to source code, but this could be sidestepped by a trusted repository which provides license info itself.
[1] https://haketilo.koszko.org/
I don't get it! The way JS is typically used, it doesn't even benefit from JIT all that much. Making ajax requests, doing stuff with strings, and moving DOM elements around doesn't need every CPU clock cycle to be used as optimally as possible. It's exceedingly rare for websites to actually be doing something that needs raw performance. And SPAs will be slow no matter what.
See most of the ecosystem around React, for reference. It's idiotic that things like URL management are done in Javascript. Or form controls. I guarantee that if we stopped doing this kind of stuff, JIT wouldn't matter.
To some extent this is just saying "developers will depend upon the performance given to them", and that's true, but it's also true that as soon as things like V8 and Node appeared, JS became ubiquitous. Pandora's container, if you will.
I've never used React myself, but what I've heard about it makes me question my own sanity. So are you going to tell me that instead of just updating the DOM tree directly I'm going to apply the changes to my data, then pass the entire model to the framework, which would then diff it with the previous version to get the changes back out, it would then call my functions that return components, and it would then diff the virtual DOM to find out what changed, and only then would it update the actual page? Why the fuck would anyone ever want that? What's so hard about simply changing the innerText or inserting elements or whatever?
Oh and now Google and Apple are insisting that this is the way to do UIs in native apps as well, with Compose and SwiftUI respectively.
The way the front end developer community seems to largely encourage learning top-down isn't helping either. I'll forever remember that one guy we made a small project with. He learned React but had no clue what "send a request" and "pass a parameter" means, and I had to explain him how to use XHR.
It's so that you have the page reflecting your data at all times.
The browsers should have been written this way, instead of having byzantine update functions with all forms and a pair of *Text to rule them all. But creating it in Javascript is a really bad idea.
With thousands of DOM elements on a page, the DOM becomes a bottleneck. This isn't the fault of front-end developers, and it's not really the fault of browser developers. HTML/CSS/JS is a very powerful system, but it's also complex and can cost a lot of compute. When you understand this, then the reasons for React and other front-end frameworks become easier to accept.
I haven't looked into how browsers actually do it, but my mental model for it is that if something changes, this merely sets a flag on that element or its parent that its layout is not valid any more. Then, on next vsync, all the elements that have this flag set have their layout recalculated, potentially going up the tree as necessary. The only exception is if your script tries to get any layout-related property, e.g. offsetWidth. Then, as if as part of the getter of such a property, the layout recalculation will run immediately.
That is to say, if you need to make a lot of changes to the DOM, you should make them within one JS invocation so only one layout pass happens sometime after you're done.
The principle argument in favor of React today are developer ergonomics. People don't have to manually alter individual elements anymore -- they just describe state, and React takes care of the UI change set. On top of that, you have components, etc., that are debatably more pleasant to work with, and at the least create an ecosystem advantage for users of the framework. One can certainly see the argument for something like facebook, where there are probably dozens of different things changing independently at any given time.
But that said, one really has to question whether React makes sense anymore, given LLMs. Back when the alternative was that someone had to bespoke code every UI component, it might have been worth taking the hit of having to adopt the entire React ecosystem. But now that LLMs are writing the code, there's really no argument for developer ergonomics, and suddenly, things like "rewriting URL handling in JS" are pure liabilities.
[1] Though sadly, many front-end devs don't know this.
[2] https://rossenahuh.netlify.app/React/react-concept-1---virtu...
> But now that LLMs are writing the code
Hopefully that's a temporary state of affairs and everyone will eventually go back to writing code by hand. I've never even considered using an LLM to get my job done, the whole idea is as alien to me as are these types of UI frameworks. To me, the best language to describe what you want from a computer isn't English, it's a programming language.
The popular coding AIs go down all the time. Last week all of them were down at the same time. If there's a bug causing losses of thousands or millions of dollars per minute, do we really want to let the LLM write incomprehensible code?
One of my problems was that I wanted to show data in the browser. It is a convenient delivery platform, after all. However, Chrome (and Chrome in particular) has tremendous trouble displaying large pages. A 400x400 table takes a long time to render. I could solve that in JavaScript. I had to, really.
So, as practically always, the problems stem from a combination of factors, and bad programming definitely is one of them.
See most of the ecosystem around modern systems software, for reference. It's idiotic that things like memory layout and bit-level hardware management are done in C abstractions. I guarantee that if we stopped doing this kind of stuff, compiler optimizations wouldn't matter.
To some extent this is just saying "developers will depend upon the performance given to them", and that's true, but it's also true that as soon as things like compilers and standard libraries appeared, C became ubiquitous. Pandora's container, if you will.
Cute, but no, not even close to a good metaphor. The C example is abstracting away fundamental complexity in a new platform. The other is completely re-writing -- in duplicate and slightly broken -- what the platform gives you for free. There's nothing about implementing form controls or URL management in JS that is more abstract. It's just different; a downstream bad decision that branches off a long tree of other bad decisions.
The equivalent level of idiocy in a C-related metaphor would be...I dunno...if you decided that you didn't like the way that header files worked, and decided to keep the C compiler, but build an external header-file management system in Fortran [1] that calls the C compiler for you. Or even closer to the JS metaphor, you shipped a special C compiler that had an embedded interpreted language that only activated at compile time, and you then used that language to allow any user to fundamentally change the syntax of C.
(It hopefully shouldn't be lost on you that this exact approach to language features has been repeatedly tried in the javascript world, including right now, with package management. But see also: typescript, coffeescript before that, Dart, etc. Javascript is a mess, and history repeats itself with regularity about every 5 years.)
[1] ...and then you re-write that about sixty times, each time being slightly incompatible with the last, and all having different fundamental incompatibilities with C headers.
Sites are slow because with all that excess performance they do more tracking, instead of keeping the website as-is.
Because that's the only thing business managers can come up with in that situation. It's a misaligned goal of users vs businesses.
In my opinion the "user agent" behavior of browsers is long gone, because they're not acting on behalf of their users anymore. They're acting on behalf of businesses.
Uh…no?
You’re presumably talking about specific terrible prebuilt frameworks - not someone building a nice vanilla SPA.
Please stop changing the definitions of explicit words and phrases - to anyone reading this!
For example, a search function. For a MPA, each search query would be a new page. For a SPA, each query is a new logical page, served on the same real page.
Technically yes, a SPA may have minimal client side rendering. But then it’s not doing much of anything at all - it’s just a site. When people say SPA, they typically mean an application with client side rendering.
sigh
…does someone else want to finish this up?
To expand on what I mean, if the implication isn’t obvious: a SPA with no client side rendering is just a single HTML page. It’s a document, not an application.
So SPA naturally implies client side rendering.
The difference between a SPA and MPA isn’t the amount of pages, they both have about the same amount of logic pages. It’s about where those pages are rendered. Dynamically on the front end, or on the back end.
EDIT: okay okay to expand, my website has a contact form. With JS enabled, the form submit displays a little box that says “thank you for submitting”. With JS disabled, it navigates you to a “thank you for submitting” page.
Both are the same logic page, they have the same function. One page is just rendered client side, and one server side. Most websites or applications are hybrids. There’s very few true single page applications, and very few true multi page applications. Most SPAs have multiple real pages for different things. Most MPAs combine multiple logic pages into one real page.
> Most websites or applications are hybrids.
and some are emphatically not.
But…where were you going with that?
Could you point out where you think the gotcha is? I can taste the tone.
Just because a bunch of engineers applied implicit meaning that didn’t exist to a very literal phrase for a few years doesn’t make it correct.
Doesn’t make webapps inherently bad.
Doesn’t make SPAs bad.
At this point, app pretty much implies React - ask an LLM for an app and see if that’s not what you get.
especially when you’re writing your own stuff,
that’s when you know from the start that scaling doesn’t matter! =]
Related, and more powerful than my comments in this thread are going to be:
https://www.robinsloan.com/notes/home-cooked-app/
So you have to guarantee that your product will stay low users and low features forever or spend a very high effort to try to partially overcome that block when you change your mind.
And guaranteeing that it will stay low features is much harder than low users I think.
In exchange for that you get a better talent pool for recruiting but does that matter if your product has to stay low scale anyways?
We need simpler protocols and formats, especially those that are used over the internet. I want everyone to really start fighting for this.
I always use a browser that doesn't run any scripts (w3m) for both this reason and others. It hurts when I see websites that don't work without js. A bit funny though that this page is one of them so I was not able to read it.
Wikipedia is basically the most popular application of all time and it doesn't rely on javascript. People just generally don't give a shit about where their money goes.
The whole biosphere is over there in the corner, weeping.
But we do! It doesn't get much simpler than HTML/CSS/JS. It's just abused to make apps instead of web documents.
https://a.singlediv.com/
(I keep WASM and WebGL disabled in Firefox settings, too. Yes, I had another post ITT questioning why those things are any less secure than the JavaScript, given that they're supposed to be in a sandbox. But you know, defense in depth. It's insane that we're expected to put up with these grossly unnecessary risks all the time. Just like how it's insane that frontier models are being tested in environments that are physically capable of connecting to the Internet at large.)
I am decidedly uninterested in those features for most web pages I visit. Should they be able to spin up my CPU fan just for that I would consider it a misfeature. Just like a movie on high volume would be.
If anyone familiar with Firefox could implement that or point in the right direction, that would be most welcome.
Like cellphones, javascript became necessary if you want to use webmail, access your bank's website, or whatever.
It's the classic thing. Across every gdmf metric, excluding with "true empathy", no one *gives a fuck* until it affects them, or someone within (1-3) degrees of separatation. And having broad empathy is generally a good way to get yourself labeled/astrocized: both about as obvious "compriate" and obvious "adversary".
astrocized - banished to outer space.
I do know how to spell ostracized ? I'm not sure if that's what I meant? Truly a mess.
It's not the Bonzi-buddy and driveby-installed IE toolbars wild west of the early 00s.
Can you please provide a link to a page where a “toolbar drive-by install” occurs?
In the early 2010s you had to have JS enabled for many sites to work at all. The cost:benefit equation had became entirely different.
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3514
The problem here is that the browser failed to correctly implement those rules. If the chromium team cannot do that, what makes you think they can implement any other kind of "benign code" verification with zero bugs?
You can prove that your code terminates (or rather responds to events in a finite time, even if the event loop itself runs forever.) Or you can even prove that your code reacts quickly, ie within some time limit. You can also prove memory limits.
> The problem here is that the browser failed to correctly implement those rules. If the chromium team cannot do that, what makes you think they can implement any other kind of "benign code" verification with zero bugs?
Defense in depth. And you can have competing implementations relatively easily for this, and another way to find and report bugs. Especially if the verifier is open source.
The verifier itself can be pretty simple: it's the prover that's complicated and needs smarts, but that's being run on the author's computer, not in the user's browser.
Do you remember what the alternative was? Flash, Java, ActiveX. No thank you.
Sure security is difficult but vulnerabilities of this magnitude are rare. If anything the lesson is don't write highly security sensitive software in C/C++.
But, anyone who thinks we need JS for a functional internet is fucking retarded
Fortunately I disabled js by default. Unfortunately, it breaks about 30% of the web. Including nvd.nist.gov, which shows a completely blank page without js enabled, even though with js it’s just a simple page with only static content.
More like 99%
I use Firefox with Noscript and I'm _totally aware_ that almost no website works without allowing it JS.
Even using Noscript it's becoming more and more exhausting every year, it's plain impossible to browse the internet without JS at all.
This is not something just anyone is going to rush into. Bigger teams or js/ts evangelists will eventually arrive at that point if they're running something where no-js (really a side effect of seo goals) is important, but "normal people" will spend this time and engineering effort elsewhere.
I think the industry in general is moving past React, as now, and definitely in near future, the only thing that matters is ideas, the rest is for the LLMs to figure out, and so the "frameworks" are going to completely disappear from people's minds as "programming" essentially becomes "telling the AI what to do" and the AI writes asm or even binary. That is when, no JS, may become more viable again lol.
People, including me, resist it, but in the future "programming" is not going to be about writing code (or even checking it, we're way too slow and error-prone to do that), but about coming up with ideas of how to capture real world problems in an IT system, and how to solve those problems by existing (or novel) ways, picking the right tools for the job (say a statistician picking the fitting metric to capture some property of the system that will actually project meaningful observability improvements and not be "just a bunch of noise") and making the right architectural decisions in terms of correctness, performance, scope, taking into account deadlines and budget. And being the domain model glue. Everything else, all the nitty gritty we used to call programming, all the <insert a quadrillion of CS jargon keywords>, is going to be done by AI ... it's a mag 9.5 quake tsunami and it can't be stopped now.
This might completely wipe out things like React (which are largely made for humans writing the code, not for humans consuming the output of that code) faster than anyone thought possible.
Only 30?
Only 30%? In 2026? With CloudFlare and Anubis et al absolutely everywhere? Not to mention SPAs
The V8 vulnerability being exploited today, CVE-2026-85046, is listed in NVD under CWE-843, "Access of Resource Using Incompatible Type ('Type Confusion')."[2] On this class of vulnerabilities, MITRE explains:
> When a memory buffer is accessed using the wrong type, it could read or write memory out of the bounds of the buffer
Memory safety is specifically intended to prevent errors like these from becoming arbitrary out-of-bounds memory access and native code execution. Even type safety --- from the 1970s --- can prevent type confusion.
The CISA and the NSA have called for the adoption of memory-safe languages.[3] We exercise poor engineering judgment and poor ethics, as an industry, when we continue to expose users to classes of wholly avoidable security weaknesses in Internet-facing software.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed
[2] https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/843.html
[3] https://www.nsa.gov/Press-Room/Press-Releases-Statements/Pre...
Here's the commit that fixes this issue: https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8/+/e0562d87ad9c17042b...
We’re past the era where security issues emanating from memory-unsafe code were tolerated due to being unavoidable — continuing to expose your software’s users to them in this present day and age is simply a choice.
There are classes of type system—"dependently-typed"—where you can encode arbitrary predicates into the type checking. I've remember seeing examples where they could prove arbitrary facts at the assembly level, including self-modifying code. Lean is such a language, currently very popular, but there are others.
Correctness of such programs depends on some basic assumptions about the CPU/memory environment, which should work absent hardware bugs like speculative execution or side channels. Although these could probably be encoded as well, and accounted for.
Without such a general proof language, you could probably make a special language to support JIT development, although its type system would be very complicated and the language itself could be a source of bugs.
Given such languages or proofs (maybe tractable now with AI-assisted theorem proving), you can actually make insanely performant code, since you don't really need to rely on other runtime protection so much (although maybe a good idea still).
Per OP link, it only affects Chrome versions prior to .82; .82 was released as stable 2 days ago. [1]
(HN title also does not match the original title, which is the CVE ID -- not particularly intuitive.)
[1] https://chromereleases.googleblog.com/2026/09/stable-channel...
https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/releases
https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/releases
Only if you use Nightly wait maybe not.
> Type confusion in V8 in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.82 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page.
So it was fixed in 152.0.7977.82 (before .83), if I read that right.
"Affected products: ... Up to (excluding) 152.0.7977.82"
.82 is fixed.
> allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code *inside the sandbox*
I have a feeling someone’s going to make an open source browser using Ladybird’s engine before Ladybird has official binaries.
I know this is old: https://madaidans-insecurities.github.io/firefox-chromium.ht...
but has the situation changed substantially in favor of Firefox?
https://www.wilderssecurity.com/threads/security-chromium-ve...
The reason why I support Gecko and Ladybird’s engine is because I am opposed to monoculture, however. Even if Gecko (Firefox) is less secure than Chromium (Chrome, Edge, etc.), by not having a monoculture, a Chrome exploit will only take down the subset of people using the Chromium ecosystem, and not affect Gecko users. Alas, most people are in the Chromium ecosystem right now so that means malicious hackers only need to target one codebase.
It’s the same reason I wrote MaraDNS back in 2001—back then, there was only one open source DNS server[1,2] so I wrote another one.[3]
[1] Djbdns was around back then but wasn’t open source, which limited its adoption.
[2] https://lwn.net/2001/0208/
[2] MaraDNS was and is optimized for running at most a few dozen domains on a system running a bunch of other services, where one does not want the DNS server causing security problems for the server, and where the DNS server needs to be lightweight as possible.
https://www.reddit.com/r/GrapheneOS/comments/1unhtxu/initial...
Is this chained with n-days?
So maybe we're going to see another CVE for the sandbox escape soon?
Those folks would not be disclosing their sandbox escape unless they were good guys.
(Posted with a memory safe WebKit, Fil-C FTW)
In the context of this vulnerability, I doubt memory safety would have made much of a difference.
This is a great reminder though, currently doing a full userspace replacement on my 3D printer and Fil-C might be just what I need for the irreplaceable C parts.
https://issues.chromium.org/issues/542403045
"CISA maintains the authoritative source of vulnerabilities that have been exploited in the wild."
What's the difference between "executing arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page" and running whatever is in the <script> tag?
You would think that an engineering school would be wiser than to require their students use a specific web browser that’s tied to a specific vendor.
[1] https://app.honorlock.com/install/extension
Schools are a business run by administrative staff who make purchasing decisions to solve business problems. Schools love to reduce billable teaching hours through online coursework, which invites academic dishonesty from students, and paying for honorlock is a way to achieve that reduction in expenditure, rather than paying tutors to supervise exams in person.
fly.io depends on Firecracker microVMs, so you should be concerned if you're running untrusted code, but not concerned about other people interacting with you wrt v8.
Cloudflare depends on v8 isolates, which depend on the trustworthiness of the v8 sandbox, which is a non-trivial hurdle, but not an insurmountable one for attackers with the resources to have a v8 bug in the first place.
I'd prefer they ask here. Just saying.
I want Chrome stay open source, but why should I believe it's possible?
Let's say that you have a type confusion bug that (in terms of the interpreted language) allows you to use an Integer variable as an Array.
That sounds nonsensical when just considering the high-level language, but your computer is going to need something to work with when running a script. For an Integer variable it will for example store the value, and for an Array it would store a pointer to a data area (and that area then contains values).
Now, if the interpreter loses track of which type a certain variable is, then it will also not know whether to interpret the internal data as a plain value (arbitrarily chosen by the script/attacker) or a pointer to well-formed data (carefully chosen by the runtime).
As an immediate step, letting the attacker use an address of their choosing for array operations would allow them to read and write arbitrary memory that is reachable with this form of addressing.
I'm putting specific emphasis on "form of addressing" here, because the v8 authors have considered this possibility and put additional protections in place. Within the sandbox, "addresses" are limited to a size of 32 bits, and address within a dedicated 4 Gigabyte area that is specifically for interpreter data. Within that area you are not going to find a lot of critical data to affect outside operations, you'd have to find a way to escape that memory area first.
The next part is going to be a bit hazy because it's been some time since I did Chromium exploitation, and getting code execution within the sandbox from data writes is itself not an easy task.
Now, we have established that there is not a lot of terribly important data within the 4 GB area. The data managing the interpreter lives outside, and any JITed code will also live outside because it needs different access permissions. We only really get to play with Objects and their data.
Objects handling executable code are rare, but there are a few that are at least adjacent. Last time I checked, WASM was one feasible choice where you get reasonably predictable results with custom data, as it included a pointer to actual executable code that represents the WASM program.
Under the assumption that the WASM interpreter/compiler does its job correctly the full block of executable code will not be very interesting. However, any integer constant in the program will end up somewhere within the executable code, and that would give you enough controllable data to encode one or two arbitrary instructions and a relative jump to the next integer constant. To start execution at the first integer constant, we'd then just modify the Object data of the WASM program to slightly offset the entrypoint.
And that's the short form of a possible (and likely outdated) way of getting semi-arbitrary code execution within the sandbox (as we are running as a WASM program, and therefore have all the usual syscall restrictions and other security features engaged).
(Posted from memory safe WebKit; i.e. WebKit compiled with filcc and all of WebKit's dependencies compiled with filcc.)
https://fil-c.org/pizlix
Then build WebKit using do_cmake_yolo_simpler.sh in projects/webkitgtk-2.44.3
It's still pretty rough, but works more than well enough to post on HN. My regression test is to post on X. That works too
Pls file bugs if you encounter issues.
Also, fair warning, it's hella slow right now on JS-heavy websites (like X). It barely works.
But we can fix that with some effort, I think
It's damn near impossible to verify that the JIT is correct.
But it is possible to verify at runtime that the code that the JIT emitted obeys some memory safety law.
(V8's heap sandbox is an example of this; a sarcastic JIT would be an arguably stronger example of this.)
IIRC rustc still has a couple of known soundness bugs, for example. It’s only been a few weeks since someone managed to exploit Lean, and Lean is all about formalizing things :)
I have a new tech called SaRCAsm, which is a memory-safe assembler. So the next step is a "Sarcastic JIT" :-)
WebKit's JS engine (JavaScriptCore) is super friendly to pointer capabilities. I did not have to change much to make it use the Fil-C GC instead of its own GC and to make it use a capability per JS object.
On the other hand, Chromium's JS engine (V8) does a bunch of crazy stuff with pointer encoding, so the best you could do there is probably a single arena for the whole JS heap.
Also, JavaScriptCore has a well-supported mode that involves not only zero JIT but a fully portable C++ interpreter. Not sure V8 has that.
{
};That finally convinced me getting data using functions (accessors, getters, setters) is a good thing, even in C :) Just all that unnecesary if's are so annoing and killing performance...
It's because User Interaction is Required. CVSS 10 would be the case where everyone can be exploited without interaction.
Interestingly the 8.8 is more alert-worthy than the 9.8 and 10 cvss, because there is a need to be alerted of the current security risk, whereas with a cvss 2 vuln, there is nothing to be done by users, only admins.
Same for the Linux kernel. Considering the Fermat's Last Theorem lean proof was 13MLoC and cost $300,000 it would cost $2M to rewrite Chromium & Linux in Rust going purely of combined LoC.
"Sorry, but to enter this shop you need to take one of the used syringes from that pile some dude delivers every day and poke yourself with it."
The "all chromium versions" part of the title is also misleading, most browser CVEs do not distinguish between "untested lower bound" vs "affects all" (even though it seems like it'd be trivial to bisect).
like those news agencies have obituaries of famous old people pre-written
I bet famous people have their people write one to distribute immediately.
Also, writing those for your family sucks, easier to do it when they are alive and can tell some key stories.
Windows: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/HEAD/docs/d...
Linux: https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromium/src/+/0e94f26e8/d...
https://chromium.googlesource.com/v8/v8.git/+/refs/heads/mai...
However, chrome.exe itself does because it's a native application, as is the sandboxed JavaScript interpreter inside of chrome.exe.
(This is a very oversimplified explanation but I think this is the disconnect people are having)
this is besides the point, but javascript has the file system api.
anyways to your broad point, i dont think this is convincing. What's the difference between not having an api vs having an api that is disabled (e.g. the syscall exists but is filtered). Either way you are not taking the action. RCE in the sandbox is an important step in the bigger exploit chain, but not because you can express things in the traditional syscalls inside the sandbox.
But the process is still more capable than the VM. The process can talk to other processes via IPC, for example.
That's why you don't go from "javascript -> computer is taken over", instead you go from "javascript -> renderer control -> computer is taken over".
can't get a proper ios/Android RCE with just JS code exec
Well which is precisely why we have sandboxes.
To me "executing arbitrary code in the sandbox" is similar to "I don't give a flying fuck for it's what a sandbox is for".
More information is needed. As someone commented: this has to be paired with at least another exploit to make anything remotely useful.
A sandbox is a sandbox. We want to understand how "code running in a sandbox" is "actively exploited".
Even with the sandbox protection layer, the rest of the parameters are maxed out.
My read of Google's disclosure is that there is likely no known escape from the sandbox. I don't agree this would be reported this way just because "user action" like "using web browser" is required. Even if this individual CVE is correctly an 8.8 there would be a critical assessment of a known chain. The only reason there wouldn't be, would be if the other vulnerability is known to Google but has no patch yet.
https://github.com/nordstjernen-web/northstar-browser/blob/m...
To be clear, I'm not saying it doesn't. I'm saying I don't understand.
https://github.com/nordstjernen-web/northstar-browser/blob/m...
It just isn’t what free speech is.
It’s a separate thing.
Speaking more generally, don't let your ideals bias your judgment. Just because you support policy X and also view ideal Y as good that doesn't mean that X isn't detrimental to Y. It's important to be objective about these things.
(And no, I don't use it except for testing).
That said I still use Firefox for other reasons.
I simply don’t trust google, I don’t trust Mozilla either but I do trust them more than Google and you do kinda have to have a browser to function in the modern world.
If you're paranoid, disable JIT.
It can’t trick Canva into letting you use the color picker, or otherwise enable it, can it - if someone happens to know?
(What a dumb feature to be locked to the Googlesphere.)
For non technical users, scam adverts are probably the biggest threat.
So i agree ubo is an important security technology, but its probably irrelavent to the topic at hand.
> and on top of it you’re recommending an extension as a security measure
... Yes? Why can a browser extension not be a security measure/improvement?
uBO MV2 and MV3 in any of the higher two modes objectively add more attack surface when the alternative is basic uBoL + DNS level filtering which is the most secure combination second to just DNS-only filtering.
And ultimately ad blocking is only badness enumeration which is a poor security measure to rely on, especially when the main application (Firefox) lacks proper security measures versus Chromium. It’s like the NVIDIA owners coming up with 3,000 different cable solutions to the burning connectors when its a problem with the card itself.
Chromium is still far superior on the security front than any other browser.
Which is exactly what happened here, as it turns out. This isn't a breakout (or isn't alleged to be a breakout) to the broader OS, only to the sandbox environment.